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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to provide a critical discussion of the contributions of the African 
Union towards the potential development of an African security community since its 
inception in 2002. Utilising Security Community Theory, and the framework for the 
study of security communities developed by Adler & Barnett (1998) it commences 
with an interrogation of the AU. This interrogation is arranged along the three tiers of 
the framework. 
The first tier is the precipitating conditions, which cause states to orient themselves 
in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. The second tier 
investigates the factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective 
identity. The third, and final, tier identifies the necessary conditions of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change. 
The study goes on and introduces three African case studies, which illustrate the 
contributions of the African Union towards the potential development of an African 
security community. The case studies are the African Union mission in Burundi, the 
African Union mission in Sudan, and the recent intervention of the African Union in 
the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. All three case studies were able to provide 
ample evidence to illustrate the AU’s contributions.  
The study concludes with two major findings. Firstly, this study is able to illustrate 
that the AU has made significant contributions towards the development of peace 
and security in Africa. Secondly, that the AU has made significant contributions at all 
three tiers of the framework, and therefore major contributions to the potential 
development of an African security community. However, the AU is still in its 
embryonic phase, and any prediction concerning the existence, or potential 
existence of an African security community would be premature. 
Even though there are ostensibly, positive developments in the area of continental 
peace and security this study is able to illustrate several remaining challenges to 
further contributions by the AU. The first is a lack of resources. The AU is heavily 
dependent on the contributions of its member states, and a number of members 
persistently fail to meet their contributions to the organization. A second challenge is 
the loosely defined relationship with the UN (and other external partners). It is crucial 
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that a constructive relationship be established, if not, differences might antagonise 
the two organisations and negatively affect any future contributions of the AU 
towards the development of an African security community. Finally, the role of core 
states, most notably regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria will remain 
important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of an African 
security community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za


OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis poog om n kritiese bespreking te bied van die bydra wat die Afrika Unie 
na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het 
sedert sy intrede in 2002. Deur gebruik te maak van Sekuriteits Gemeeenskap 
Teorie, en die raamwerk vir die studie van sekuriteits gemeenskappe deur Adler & 
Barnett (1998) begin die studie met n direkte ondersoek van die AU. Hierdie 
ondersoek vind plaas volgens die drie vlakke van die raamwerk.   
Die eerste vlak is die kondisies wat veroorsaak dat state hulself na mekaar orienteer, 
en n wil ontwikkel om hulle sake te koordineer. Die tweede vlak ondersoek die 
faktore vir die ontwikkeling van wedersydse vertroue en gesamentlike identiteit. Die 
derde, en finale, vlak identifiseer die nodige kondisies van afhanklike verwagtinge vir 
vreedsame verandering.  
Die studie gaan voort met drie Afrika geval studies, wat die bydra van die AU na die 
potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap illustreer. Die geval 
studies sluit in die Afrika missie in Burundi, die Afrika missie in Sudan, en die 
onlangse intervensie deur die AU in die na-eleksie krisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Al drie 
geval studies verskaf wye getuienis wat die bydra van die AU illustreer.  
Die studie sluit af met twee hoof bevindings. Eerstens, kon hierdie studie illustreer 
dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes na die ontwikkeling van vrede en sekuriteit in 
Afrika gemaak het. Tweedens, dat die AU betekenisvolle bydraes op al drie vlakke 
van die raamwerk gemaak het, en daarom ook mondige bydraes tot die potensiele 
ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap gemaak het. Nogtans, is die AU 
self nog in n onvolwasse stadium, en enige voorspelling in verband met die bestaan, 
of oor die potensiele bestaan van n Afrika sekuriteits gemeenskap is voortydig.  
Al is daar opmerkilike positiewe ontwikkelinge in die area van kontinentale vrede en 
sekuriteit, kan hierdie studie steeds verskeie uitdagings identifiseer wat verdere 
bydraes deur die AU kan hinder. Die eerste uitdaging is n tekort aan bevondsing. Die 
AU is hoogs afhanklik op die bydrae van sy lidmaat state, maar n paar lede mis 
aanhoudend hulle bydraes tot die orginasasie. n Tweede uitdaging is die 
ongedefineerde verhouding tussen die AU en die VN (en ander eksterne vennote). 
Dit is belangrik dat n konstruktiewe verhouding in werk gestel word, indien nie, kan 
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verskille die twee organisasies van mekaar dryf en enige toekomstige bydraes van 
die AU na die potensiele ontwikkeling van n Afrika sekuriteits kompleks negatief 
beinvloed. Laastens, sal die rol van kern state, mees aanmerklik streek leiers soos 
Suid Afrika en Nigerie, belangrik bly om die sekuriteits kompleks te stabiliseer en 
verdere ontwikkeling in die toekoms te bevorder.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1. 1 Background 
The new union is a re-emergence of the quest for African unity, a 
project dating back to the years before independence in the 20th 
century. Pan-Africanism was an expression of resistance against 
colonial occupation and it became synonymous with the common 
aspiration for peace and freedom. The Pan-African movement thus 
gave birth, initially, to the Organisation of African Unity and has once 
again been the cornerstone of the continents political collective in the 
form of the African Union (Salim A. Salim, 2008). 
Cawthra (2004: 26) describes the end of the Cold War as a fitting close to the 20th 
century, the end of the “modern period” that was ushered in 100 years ago. This 
period has been characterised by the process of globalization. “It is a world in which 
time and space has been compressed, and the density of political, economic, and 
cultural interactions has intensified as a result of technological innovations and the 
“information revolution”. This, in turn, has led to the integration of many institutions 
(including states) into systems that have global dimensions.  
During this period on 25 May 1963, 32 independent African states formed their “own” 
integrated institution in the form of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) in Addis 
Ababa. The principal aim of the OAU was to free the African continent from 
colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination. A further 21 states joined gradually 
over the years, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member in 1994 (Naldi, 1999:1). 
The most obvious security consequence of the end of the Cold War was the 
breakdown of the bipolar system, in which nations were broadly aligned with either 
Washington or Moscow. The situation thereafter, is however more complicated. It 
can be argued that economic power has become dispersed, with several leading 
powers and some challengers (most notably the US, China, and the EU), whilst the 
political and cultural power holders are not as easily pinpointed. The dominant 
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military position of the US goes unchallenged which now spends more on defence 
than the next eight or nine “powers” combined (Cawthra, 2004: 28).  
As noted by the end of the Cold War, the world completely changed. Africa and the 
OAU, however, did not. Africa became increasingly marginalised and struggled to 
define its place and role in the new global system. The great powers increasingly 
declined to assume leading roles in promoting peace (most notably the debacles in 
Rwanda, Somalia, and Angola, with the Americans preferring to operate on their own 
or with regional organisations such as NATO) and development in the region 
(Cawthra, 2004: 28). It was therefore incumbent on Africa itself to consider a new 
political and economic order securing "African solutions for African problems”.  
By the time of its thirtieth anniversary, most analysts of the OAU concluded that the 
organization could not meet future demands without serious reform and 
reorganization. Experts agreed that the OAU Charter needed revision, most 
specifically with regard to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
(Packard & Rukare, 2002: 367). 
During the latter half of the 1990’s African states took a series of decisions to 
overhaul the continental organization, endorsing new norms and adopting new rules 
to govern their interaction on matters of peace, security and development; and 
establish new institutions to enforce these norms. This transformation took a 
concrete turn when, on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, African Heads of State and 
Government declared their commitment to transform the OAU into a new 
organization, the African Union (AU). On 11 July 2000, at the 36th Ordinary Summit 
of the OAU in Lomé, Togo, the legal-institutional framework for the new organization 
was adopted in the form of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU was 
launched in July 2002 in South Africa (Engel & Porto, 2010: 1-2). 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The formation of the AU in 2002 brought with it a completely new set of objectives 
and principles as set out in the Constitutive Act. African leaders optimistically 
committed themselves to a “new set of rules” according to which the continent would 
be governed in the future. This new set of rules placed a heavy importance on a 
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more integrated continent with increased co-operation between African states to 
foster continental peace and stability (Engel & Porto, 2010: 2-3).  
Nearly a decade after its inception there has been mixed responses from academic 
scholars with regard to the performance of the AU; therefore, this research project 
proposes an interrogation of the contribution made by the Union. However, this 
interrogation will be limited to the contribution made by the AU concerning the 
development of an African Security Community.  
Africa is not commonly accepted as a security community, but Franke (2008: 325) 
argues, “the continent currently displays all the essential characteristics of (at least) 
a loosely coupled security community”. Security Community Theory defines a 
security community, as well as explains the development of a security community. 
Thus, it can be hypothesized that if Africa were considered a security community, 
using Security Community Theory one would be able to illustrate how the AU has 
contributed to the development of an African security community since its inception 
in 2002.  
For this interrogation, Security Community Theory as presented by Karl Deutsch 
(1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998) will be utilised. According to Deutsch (1957: 5) a 
security community, “is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some 
other way”. In 1998, Adler & Barnett offered a revival of the concept of security 
communities after decades of neglect and criticism. The revived concept “benefits 
from the best of Deutsch’s original conceptualization and corrects for its 
shortcomings by borrowing from four decades of substantial insights from 
sociological and international relations theory and various empirical studies that were 
informed by the concept of security communities” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 29).  
It should be noted that this project will not elaborate on Franke’s (2008) argument 
about the existence of an African Security Community, but instead will probe the 
contributions made by the AU in the realm of peace and security that could 
potentially contribute towards the creation of a security community in the near future. 
This interrogation will be limited to the continental level and cooperation amongst 
member states of the Union at this level, and will therefore not consider arguments 
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such as those presented by Laurie Nathan (2006: 276-277) in Domestic Instability 
and Security Communities. He believes that the relationship between security 
communities and domestic stability has been neglected in the revival of Deutsch and 
argues, that “domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a 
country, is a necessary condition of a security community”. This project will not 
consider the national or domestic level.  
1.3 Research Question 
The research question for this study is as follows: How has the AU contributed 
towards the development of an African security community since its inception 
in 2002? 
Furthermore, this research will have the following sub-questions: 
1. How can Security Community Theory be utilized to interrogate the 
contribution of the AU? 
2. Which contributions according to Security Community Theory have the 
AU made to continental security? 
3. Can these contributions be illustrated with African case studies in 
which the AU was/is involved? 
1.4 Purpose and Significance  
The inception of the AU in 2002 coincided with a significant “shift” amongst African 
leaders regarding security issues on the continent. This shift involved a new security 
architecture, which included the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its organs 
the AU commission, the Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS), and the African Standby Force (ASF). It also involved a 
shift in norms from the previous state centric approach to one revolving around 
human security (Powell, 2005).  
The most significant advancement in this regard was the adoption of Article 4 (h)  of 
the AU’s Constitutive Act which dictates “the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity”. Much 
of this change was introduced in Article 3 (a) of the Constitutive Act which states that 
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to “achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa” especially within the area of continental peace and stability (AU, 
2002a). Finally the shift also involved greater cooperation between the AU and the 
regional economic organizations “which it does not regard as competitors in a zero-
sum game, but instead relies on them as essential building blocks and 
implementation agencies”… “this multi-layered approach to inter-African cooperation 
is most clearly enshrined in the continents emerging peace and security architecture” 
(Franke, 2008: 330).  
As the AU contends, through the Constitutive Act, to promote continental security it 
seems appropriate (nearly a decade after its inception) to interrogate how the AU 
has potentially contributed towards the development of an African Security 
Community.  
The academic application of Security Community Theory is in the main confined to 
Western scholarly work and therefore by applying it to the AU this project could 
possibly add to the literature in two ways. Firstly, as Smith (2006: 4) has noted “the 
different social, political, economic, cultural (including intellectual), historical, 
geographical and ideological contexts found in the global South, in comparison to the 
North, (thus) provides potentially fertile ground for innovative perspectives”. This 
project could consequently provide an “African” perspective.  
Secondly, it will introduce an area of study that has received very little attention in 
the past. Security Community Theory has mainly been applied in Western cases e.g. 
the EU (see Waever in Adler & Barnett, 1998) and NATO (see Deutsch, 1957) and 
within the ASEAN region (see Acharya, 1998 & 2009; and Higgot & Nossal in Adler 
and Barnett, 1998).  
As Ngoma (2003: 41) has noted “scholars such as Adler and Barnett have made 
important strides in the articulation of the security community paradigm and yet have 
failed to recognise its applicability to the African continent. Instead, they have 
focused on Europe, South-East Asia, South America, the Gulf region, Australia, and 
North America. Therefore, there is an analytical gap that needs to be filled with 
respect of work on the African continent in general,” and Franke (2008: 320) agrees, 
“serious discussions about the existence of a continental security community in 
Africa have hardly begun.”  
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When applied to Africa it has been limited to the regional levels such as ECOWAS 
and SADC (Ngoma, 2003; Hammerstad, 2005; Cawthra, 2008; Hentz, 2009). 
Presently only Franke’s (2008) work Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the 
Concept of Multi-layered Security Communities and Schoeman’s (2002) Imagining a 
Community: The African Union as an Emerging Security Community have attempted 
to do this and therefore will shed light on a fairly “unexplored” area.   
1.5 Literature Review 
This study departs theoretically from the work done on security communities by Karl 
Deutsch (1954, 1957, & 1967) and Adler & Barnett (1998). A “security community is 
generally defined as a group of states integrated to the point where people have 
dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Franke, 2008: 314). Richard van 
Wagenen initially introduced the concept in 1952, but the study by Deutsch et al. 
(1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area popularized the concept. 
Deutsch (1957: 5) defines a security community as “one in which there is a real 
assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, 
but will settle their disputes in some other way”. Deutsch (1957: 5) believed that “if 
the entire world were an integrated security community, wars would automatically be 
eliminated.”   
In 1998, Adler & Barnett offered a reconstructed architecture for the security 
community premised on the earlier work of Deutsch. They presented a framework, 
which “benefits from the best of Deutsch’s original conceptualization and corrects for 
its shortcomings by borrowing from four decades of substantial insights from 
sociological and international relations theory and various empirical studies that were 
informed by the concept of security communities”. Crucial for this study their work 
included “a framework for the study of security communities” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 
29). This framework is analytically organised around three tiers.  
The first tier consists of precipitating factors that encourage states to orient 
themselves in each other’s direction and co-ordinate their policies. The second tier 
consists of the structural elements of power and ideas, and the process elements of 
transactions, international organizations, and social learning. The dynamic, positive, 
and reciprocal relationship between these variables leads to the third tier: the 
development of trust and collective identity formation. The sequenced and causal 
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relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 30). This 
framework will be utilised in this study to interrogate the contribution of the AU to an 
African Security Community.  
Notable contributions from African scholars on the (potential) existence of a security 
community in Africa include Selebi (1999),  Schoeman (2002),  Van Schalkwyk 
(2005),  and Ngoma (2003 & 2005). Whilst prominent local contributions with regard 
to the African Union, its institutions and specifically its “new” security arrangements 
include The African Union and its Institutions (Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba & Murithi, 
2008),  The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance 
(Makinda & Okumu, 2008), and Towards a Union Government for Africa: Challenges 
and Opportunities (Murithi, 2007).  
With the inception of the AU in 2002, there has been a significant shift in the 
approach of African leaders towards continental security. The “adoption of the 
Constitutive Act was a decisive step, showing that African states have not 
conveniently changed the name of their continental organization, but indeed giving it 
a radical new vision and mission, a set of clearly defined objectives and 
responsibilities” (Engel & Porto, 2010: 2).  
The AU introduced a new security architecture, which as the title of the edited work 
by Engel & Porto (2010) explains, “promotes norms and institutionalized solutions.” 
Franke’s (2008) work is able to illustrate how the AU’s new architecture has evolved 
in line with the development of a security community as presented in Adler & 
Barnett’s (1998) theory on the subject.   
The edited volume of Juma (2006) the Compendium of Key Documents Relating to 
Peace and Security in Africa demonstrates this evolution through the various 
treaties, protocols, and declarations that have been adopted by the member states of 
the AU. It commenced with the Constitutive Act in 2000/01 and was followed by 
NEPAD in 2001, the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council in 2002/03, 
the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy in 2004, 
and the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact in 2005.  
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The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union (2002/2003) was responsible for the introduction of the AU’s new 
security architecture by introducing the PSC with its organs the AU commission, the 
CEWS, the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund, and the ASF.  
Another significant advancement since its inception was the signing of the Solemn 
Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) (2004). 
The framework of the CADSP establishes a common understanding of the concepts 
of defence, security, and common threat. Importantly the notion of security includes 
both traditional state centric security and human security. Franke (2008: 322) notes, 
“it is the AU’s underlying acceptance of the normative commitment to protect which 
distinguishes it from its feeble predecessor”. The “AU, like the Responsibility to 
Protect, clearly lay out provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of a member 
state through military force, if necessary” (Powell, 2005: 4).   
Finally, the AU has continued to recognise the importance of the regional economic 
communities (REC’s). These regional communities were originally developed as 
centres for regional economic development, but insecurity served as a major 
impediment to this development. Therefore, these communities developed and 
currently possess security mechanisms. The AU retained the original organizational 
significance of these communities as set out in the Abuja treaty of 1991 and “Article 
16 of the PSC Protocol and the CADSP stress that the regional mechanisms will 
form the building blocks of the AU’s peace and security architecture” (Powell, 2005: 
16). The importance of the REC’s is also visible in the regional arrangements of the 
CEWS and ASF.  
To illustrate the contribution of the organisation to a continental security community 
the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the AU 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire will be introduced as case studies.   
The conflict in Burundi was driven by ethnic rivalries between the Hutu and Tutsi 
people. Even though the Burundian population consists of 85 percent Hutu, and only 
15 percent Tutsi, the latter has controlled power positions in the country since 
independence in 1962. This has since led to several violent Hutu uprisings that were 
countered by Tutsi military oppression, which according to some, at times reached 
genocide levels (Svennson, 2008: 8).  
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When a multiparty system was introduced in 1991, some attempts were made to run 
the country democratically. However, the assassination of the first democratically 
elected president led to renewed violence. In 1996, Buyoya took power and 
governed the country with the help of the Tutsi military, but eventually introduced 
reforms that saw the inclusion of Hutu’s in government. At the same time, the first 
peace negotiations took place, but it was not until 2000 that the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement were signed. The agreement called for an international 
peacekeeping force to assist in peace building efforts in Burundi. In 2003, this call 
was heeded when the AU deployed the African mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
(Svennson, 2008: 11).  
Extensive primary data on the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is available in both 
AU and UN documents and the mission has extensively been covered in academic 
books and journals (Murithi, 2008; Svennson, 2008; Franke, 2009; Rodt, 2011).  
The Sudanese conflict “is anchored in longstanding struggles over resources 
(primarily land and water) between farming and nomadic communities” (Powell, 
2005) which has been exacerbated since the droughts of mid-1980.  
Some analysts add that more than thirty years of marginalisation from governments 
in Khartoum lies at the heart of the conflict. In 2001, these tensions and continued 
marginalisation prompted the mobilisation of two rebel groups the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Powell, 2005).  
These groups have since systematically clashed with the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) and its backed Arab Militia groups (most notably the Janjaweed). Extensive 
primary data on the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is available in both AU and UN 
documents and the mission has extensively been covered in academic books and 
journals (Powell, 2005; Williams, 2006; de Waal, 2007; Adebajo, 2008; Moller, 2009) 
Violence erupted in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2010 when incumbent President 
Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the results of the 28 November run-off elections 
that declared his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, as the victor. At least 50 people were 
killed in the initial post-election violence as supporters of both men acted out their 
frustrations. Fighting talk on all sides raised fears that the post-election deadlock 
would revive the civil war. Gbagbo loyalists, who included the military and the militia 
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organization Young Patriots, told huge crowds in an Abidjan square to gear up for 
fighting, saying: "We are ready to die." Ouattara supporters, aligned with militia 
concentrated in the north, spoke of waging "the last struggle” (Walt, 2010).  
Ivorian election officials, as well as UN, US and EU officials, all stated that Ouattara 
had won the elections. They were swiftly supported by statements from the regional 
grouping ECOWAS and the AU. Rather than forcing opposition candidate Ouattara 
to accept a junior role in a Gbagbo government, as was done to Zimbabwe's Morgan 
Tsvangirai, the AU in a unilateral effort snubbed Gbagbo calling for him to step down 
(Watt, 2011).  
After several mediation attempts by the AU it was the military power of the pro-
Ouattara New Forces, the 9 000 strong UN mission in the country and French forces 
that ousted Gbagbo. Although the Côte d’Ivoire case is fairly contemporary extensive 
primary data on the AU’s involvement is available in both AU, ECOWAS and UN 
documents and the intervention has extensively been covered in news sources such 
as BBC News (2010, 2011) and allAfrica.com (2010, 2011).  
1.6 Research Methodology 
Security Community Theory as presented by Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett 
(1998) defines a security community, and is able to provide “a framework for the 
study of security communities” (Adler & Barnett 1998: 29). Adler & Barnett (1998: 49) 
explains, “the development of security communities can be broadly termed as social 
constructivist and path-dependent. The notion that security communities are socially 
constructed means that they have a history and, therefore exhibit an evolutionary 
pattern that follows the direction of “the arrow of time.” By adopting this approach 
one can trace back, starting with the “dependable expectations of peaceful change” 
to a period when they are merely imagined to exist, to the process that led to their 
development.”  
Adler (1998: 199) has also introduced the concept of a “security community-building 
institution”. He argues that “collective identities, the stuff of which security 
communities are made of, do not always evolve spontaneously; rather, as in the 
case of the expansion eastward of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community, 
they are socially constructed by institutions”. Franke (2008: 324) notes that “like the 
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OSCE in Europe, the AU, fulfil at least six of the seven functions of a community 
building institution as specified by Adler.”   
Using Security Community Theory as an analytical framework, this study proposes to 
interrogate the contribution the AU has made to the development of an African 
security community since 2002. This study will firstly comprehensively present 
Security Community Theory, by discussing the work of Deutsch (1957) and Adler & 
Barnett (1998). Thereafter it will utilize the analytical framework to evaluate the 
contribution of the AU towards the development of an African Security Community.  
The AU will be categorically interrogated along the three tiers of development as 
presented by the framework to illustrate potential contributions by the Union at the 
various stages (tiers). This will also include a more specific interrogation of the 
contribution of the AU’s new security architecture, the AU as norm entrepreneur, and 
the continued relationship between the AU and the REC’s. Finally, a chapter with 
three case studies will be introduced to illustrate, using examples, the contributions 
the AU has made. 
The first case study is the AMIB. This case study is selected, as it was the first 
operation wholly initiated, planned, and executed by the AU after its inception in 
2002. The mission will therefore shed light on the AU’s willingness and ability to act 
with due regard to its newly established norms, values, institutions and security 
architecture. This case especially illustrates the AU’s ability in terms of self-reliance 
in operationalising and implementing peace building missions, an important facet on 
the road to establishing continental peace and security.   
The second case study is the AMIS. This case study is selected as it warranted an 
intervention from the AU under the auspice of Article 4 (h), which can be considered 
as one of the most significant advancements of the AU’s Constitutive Act. The case 
study also illustrates the functionality of the new AU security architecture, including 
the possible correction of lessons learned from the AMIB case, and finally light on 
the relationship that exists between the AU and its regional partners.  
The third case study is the AU intervention into Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2010. This 
case study is selected because it offers a contemporary example of an AU 
intervention. Even though the AU’s involvement did not result in a fully-fledged AU 
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mission, it still provides workable information that can be utilised to establish the 
AU’s contribution to the development of an African Security Community. Notably this 
case study provides a “reflection point” which could possibly shed light on the 
willingness and the effective ability of the AU to get involved nine years after its 
inception, thereby illustrating whether the initial enthusiasm shown by the AU to 
achieve continental peace and security still exists.  
Finally, this case study illustrates the importance of the relationship that exist 
between the AU and the REC’s (in this case ECOWAS), and the relationship 
between the AU and the International Community, and the possible repercussions of 
these relationships for the development of an African Security Community.  
This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises of both descriptive and exploratory 
aspects. It is based upon an extensive review of related literature in the fields of 
Security Community Theory, the “new” AU security architecture and the response by 
the AU to the conflict in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS), and its involvement in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  
Both primary and secondary sources will be used, with an emphasis on including as 
much primary text as possible. These will consist mainly of official AU and UN 
documents, contributions from civil society and key persons in the field. Key persons 
include recognized academics; senior AU and UN officials involved in Africa; and 
African and Western diplomats.  
Secondary sources will consist primarily of academic journal articles, publications, 
books containing observations on, and evaluations of the above-mentioned topics, 
produced by respected authors in their respective fields.  
The unit of analysis in this study will be the AU, and specifically its contributions to a 
continental security. The level of analysis is the AU at a continental level. In terms of 
the time dimension, this study is cross sectional stretching from the inception of the 
AU in 2002 until the present. 
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1.7 Chapter Outline 
This study will consist of five individual and separate chapters. The first chapter will 
serve as an introduction. It will present the background, problem statement, purpose, 
and significance of the study, as well as the research design and methodology.  
Chapter two will introduce the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter is vital 
as the theory serves as the foundation upon which the entire study is “built”. For this 
study, Security Community Theory will be utilised. The chapter will present several of 
the works of Karl Deutsch (1957) as well as a more contemporary version by Adler & 
Barnett (1998). Importantly, Adler & Barnett (1998: 29) provides “a framework for the 
study of security communities.” 
Chapter three will interrogate and present the AU’s contribution to the formation of a 
continental security community. This evaluation will be conducted utilising the 
framework for the study of security communities as presented by Adler & Barnett 
(1998). This chapter will analyse the AU’s contribution through the three tiers around 
which the theory is organized. It will evaluate the AU’s new security architecture, the 
AU as a norm entrepreneur, as well as the relationship that exists between the AU 
and the REC’s.  
Chapter four will extend the assessment into the case studies. An appraisal of key 
AU decisions and documents is not a sufficient assessment of the contribution of the 
AU to continental security. Therefore, this chapter will introduce AMIB, AMIS and the 
AU intervention into Côte d’Ivoire as case studies from which examples will be drawn 
to illustrate the union’s contribution. 
The final chapter will serve as a conclusion and will bring all the previous chapters 
together to present key findings and recommendations. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War resulted in many changes within the world system. One of 
these changes included a transition of the OAU, which was formed in 1963, to the 
AU in 2002. This transition did not simply remove the “O” from the OAU, but also 
included a “new” African security architecture, and a significant shift in approach 
from state centric to human security.  
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Nearly a decade after its inception, it seems appropriate to evaluate the contribution 
the AU has made since its inception in 2002. Specifically, this study proposes an 
interrogation of the contribution of the AU towards the development of an African 
Security Community. For this purpose, Security Community Theory as presented by 
Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998) will be utilised. Included in Adler & 
Barnett’s (1998: 29) work is “a framework for the study of security communities” 
which is arranged around three tiers.  
The study will comprehensively present Security Community Theory, by discussing 
the work of Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998). Thereafter it will utilize the 
analytical framework to evaluate the contribution of the AU towards the development 
of an African Security Community. The AU will be categorically interrogated along 
the three tiers of development as presented by the framework to illustrate how the 
Union has contributed at the various stages (tiers). 
Finally, the AMIB, AMIS and the AU intervention in Côte d’Ivoire will be introduced as 
case studies to illustrate, with practical examples, how the AU has contributed to the 
development of an African security community since its inception in 2002.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the theoretical framework against which the research in this 
project will be conducted. The chapter will commence with an overview of the 
development of regional security. Thereafter a conceptual analysis of the terms 
security and community will be provided followed by a description of the theory of 
constructivism and its function in regional security. This will be followed by Karl 
Deutsch’s theory of security communities and thereafter Adler & Barnett’s updated 
variant. Finally, the chapter will end with concluding remarks.  
2.2 History of Regional Security  
The first generation of regional integration studies in the 1950’s and 1960’s were 
immediately concerned with economics, but fundamentally were concerned with 
peace and security. They tended to see the nation state as the problem rather than 
the solution. The relevant theories were federalism, functionalism, and neo-
functionalism (Hettne, 2008: 404). 
Federalism is a political programme that is sceptical towards the nation state and 
envisions a new kind of state. Functionalism is an approach to peace building which 
raises the question on which political level various human needs (often defined in a 
rather technical way) best could be met. Usually the best way is to go beyond the 
nation state, but not necessarily going regional. Both federalism and functionalism 
wanted the state to go, but through different routes and by different means (Hettne, 
2008: 404).  
Neo-functionalism more explicitly discusses integration as a region-building process, 
and the positive implications as far as security is concerned are taken for granted. 
Neo-functionalism is essentially the theory of European region building authored by 
Ernst Haas in 1958. What was created in Europe was according to Karl Deutsch a 
“regional security community” (Hettne, 2008: 404).  
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Today it has become commonplace to distinguish between an older wave or 
generation of regionalism and a more recent, new “generation” of regionalism 
starting in the latter half of the 1980’s and now a prevalent phenomenon throughout 
the world (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000: 457). 
This new wave must be understood in its historical context. It needs to be related to 
the structural transformation the world has recently experienced. This transformation 
includes a move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar structure, 
with a new division of power and new division of labour. It also involves the relative 
decline of the American hegemony; the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state 
system; the growth of interdependence and globalisation; and a changed attitude 
towards neo-liberal economic development and political systems (Hettne & 
Söderbaum, 2000: 457).  
The studies in new regionalism considered new aspects, particularly those focused 
on conditions related to what was called globalization. In the more recent theorizing, 
security concerns are still relevant but these are often seen as causal factors forcing 
countries to cooperate, due to the risk of regionalization of conflict. By this is meant 
both the outward spread or spill-over of a local conflict into neighbouring countries 
and the inward impact from the region, in the form of more or less diplomatic 
interference, military intervention, and preferably, conflict resolution carried out by 
some kind of regional body (Hettne, 2008: 404).  
Regionalism and security can be related in many different ways. One has to do with 
the choice of unit for investigation, e.g. a regional security complex defined by Barry 
Buzan as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart 
from one another” (Buzan, 1991: 190).  
In a second approach developed by Lake & Morgan (1997), regions are defined in 
terms of the mode of security management or “regional order”. Regional orders can 
shift from simple balance of power systems or concerns to more comprehensive 
communities or integrated polities. Alternatively, they define a “security complex” as 
“states affected by at least one trans-border but local security externality” (Lake & 
Morgan, 1997: 46).  
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A third approach is to do with the conflict management role of the organized region 
(if there is one) for internal regional security or regional order, and for the immediate 
environment of the region. “Conflict management with regard to immediate 
environment can refer to an acute conflict or aim at preventively transforming the 
situation, either by stabilization or by integration” (Hettne, 2008: 405).  
Thus, groups of states can be characterised as security complexes, regional orders, 
or security communities (not limited to). Such groups commonly aim to develop 
various forms of collaborative or co-operative approaches to security. A “common 
security approach” suggests that states in a given regional formation share common 
security concerns, often of a multidimensional nature, and together can address their 
security needs more effectively than alone or in opposition to each other (Cawthra, 
2004: 33).  
2.3 Conceptual Analysis of Security  
The term security is associated with many different meanings that refer to 
frameworks and dimensions, apply to individuals, issue areas, societal conventions, 
and changing historical conditions and circumstances. Thus, security as an individual 
or societal political value does not possess an independent meaning and is always 
related to a context and a specific individual or societal system and its realization 
(Brauch, 2008:27).  
As a social science concept “security is ambiguous and elastic” in its meaning. 
Franke (2009: 8) notes, “the usage of the term security is thus inevitably fraught with 
conceptual difficulties”. This is particularly true in the African context, for no other 
part of the world has had so little control over its own security agenda”. In 1962 
Wolfers (in Brauch, 2008: 28) pointed on the two sides of the security concept: 
“Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired 
values, in subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. 
Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished 
values; especially those that, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular 
referent object in the near future (Williams, 2008: 5). Security is a practise, a specific 
way to frame an issue. Security discourse is characterised by dramatizing an issue 
as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat: if we do 
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not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant. By labelling this a security issue, the 
actor has claimed a right to handle it with extraordinary means, to break the normal 
political rules of the game (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 80).  
The security concept has gradually widened since the 1980’s. For the constructivists, 
security is intersubjective referring to “what actors make of it” (Wendt, 1992). Thus, 
security depends on a normative core that cannot simply be taken for granted. 
Political constructions of security have real world effects, because they guide the 
actions of policymakers, thereby exerting constitutive effects on political order 
(Brauch, 2008: 28). 
Security in an objective sense refers to specific security dangers e.g. to threats, 
challenges, vulnerabilities and risks to specific security dimensions (political, military, 
economic, societal environmental) and referent objectives (international, national, 
human) as well as sectors (social, energy, food, water) (Brauch, 2008: 28). 
Studying the use of security is therefore informative for tracing security communities. 
If security is legitimised with the community as a referent object this assists in 
consolidating the community, and if it is done within the community it limits the risk of 
triggering political escalations within which the community might unravel. Many 
different actors can use the security move, but typically, there are relatively limited 
numbers of possible referent objects (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 80).  
2.4 Conceptual Analysis of Community 
The concept of community can be defined in both constructivist and rationalist terms. 
A constructivist definition would state that a community refers to a human collectivity 
that is constituted by shared norms and understandings among its members. Due to 
common values, identities, and goals, they feel solidarity with each other (Väyrynen, 
2000: 114). 
The rationalist approach builds the definition of community on the concept of interest. 
The members of a community try to control resources that are of value to them. As 
no member can usually obtain the control over all relevant resources, he engages in 
transactions with other members. The aim is to make sure that his access to 
resources improves or that the remaining resources are not used against him 
(Väyrynen, 2000: 114). 
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Adler & Barnett (1998: 31) shows that a community is defined by three 
characteristics. First, members of a community have shared identities, values, and 
meanings. “Common meanings are the basis of community” and “intersubjective 
meaning” gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a 
common understanding of certain norms. “If we treat identities and interests as 
always in process during interaction, then we can see how an evolution of 
cooperation might lead to an evolution of community” (Wendt, 1994: 390).  
Secondly, “those in a community have many sided and direct relations; interaction 
occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather through 
some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings” (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 31).  
Thirdly, “communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term 
interest derived from the knowledge of those with whom one is interacting, and 
altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility” (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 31) 
These three defining qualities of a community can exist at the local, domestic, or the 
international level. There is no priori reason why they should be limited to the 
territorial state. There are ample historical reasons why these qualities are more 
likely to reside at the domestic level; obviously networks, interactions, and face-to-
face encounters have generally been limited to relatively short distances (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 32).  
However, this is a contingent claim and allows for the possibility that these elements 
might emerge at the international level under the right conditions. Such conditions 
might already be present because technological developments and economic forces 
have radically transformed the international environment and made possible different 
forms of communication and identification previously unavailable, unimagined, and 
sometimes undesired. These new developments can in fact allow for the 
development of a sense of community among people who are not physically co-
present (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 32).  
By acknowledging, that communities develop around networks, interactions, and 
face-to-face encounters that are not dependent on inhabiting the same geographic 
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space, we reconceptualise the very idea of regions. Scholars (e.g. Deutsch) have 
difficulty identifying precisely where one region ends and another begins; yet they 
tend to define regions based on geography because of the assumption that proximity 
generates common interests (see Deutsch, 1954) that derive from a common 
culture, economic circumstance, and security concerns. But individuals can organise 
and define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to space, 
suggesting something of an “imagined community”, or a “cognitive region” e.g. 
Australia is a member of the Western security community even though it resides 
thousands of miles from the “core” members (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 33).  
2.5 Constructivism, Security and Regional Security   
Constructivism, a term first elaborated by Nicholas Onuf in his groundbreaking book 
World of Our Making in 1989, is a broad theoretical approach to the study of 
International Relations (Mcdonald, 2008: 60). However, within little over a decade, it 
has risen to be one of the top three paradigms in the discipline (Franke, 2009: 22).   
Despite attention to security issues, the extent to which constructivists have 
developed a theory of international security is limited (Mcdonald, 2008: 60). Franke 
(2009: 23) has identified “three common concerns that serve as a useful starting 
point”.  
Firstly, constructivists argue that normative and ideational structures are just as 
important as material structures. Secondly, constructivists of all stripes agree that 
ideational structures are important because they shape the identities and therefore 
interests of actors in world politics. Finally, a common concern that binds 
constructivists is the view that the relationship between agents and structures is 
mutually constitutive.  
Karin Fierke (2007: 56) has argued, “to construct something is an act which brings 
into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist”. This does not 
necessarily mean that there is no such thing as security or that security is devoid of 
meaning. “Security may be understood, for example as the preservation of a group’s 
core values. But such a broad definition of security tells us little about who the group 
itself is; what its core values are; where threats to those values may come from; and 
how the preservation or advancement of these values might be achieved”.  
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For constructivists, answers to these questions are different in different contexts and 
develop through social interaction between actors. Moreover, it is the answers to 
these questions, articulated and negotiated in a particular social and historical 
context through social interaction, that bring security into being (Mcdonald, 2008: 
61).  
Other constructivists have focused on the possibility for the security dilemma to be 
ameliorated in different contexts. “This is apparent in literature exploring the 
possibilities for the emergence of security communities, namely a group of actors 
(usually states) for whom the use of force in resolving disputes between each other 
has become unthinkable over time” (Mcdonald, 2008: 67).  
In summary, constructivists share a belief that security is a social construction, 
meaning different things in different contexts. Security is also seen as a site of 
negotiation and contestation, in which actors compete to define the identity and 
values of a particular group in such a way to provide a foundation for political action. 
Identity and norms are seen as central to the study of security, together providing the 
limits for feasible and legitimate political action. Finally, agents and structures are 
mutually constituted and, because the world is one of our own making, even 
structural change is always possible even if difficult (Mcdonald, 2008: 67).   
2.6 Deutsch and Security Communities 
“A security community is generally defined as a group of states integrated to the 
point where people have dependable expectations of peaceful change. Initially 
proposed by Richard van Wagenen in 1952,  it was with the seminal 1957 study by 
Karl Deutsch and his associates that the concept received its first in-depth 
theoretical and empirical treatment” (Franke, 2008: 314).  
Whilst at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Deutsch and several of his 
colleagues applied their skills to “study the possible ways in which men someday 
might abolish war”. The result of this study was Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area (1957). The work did not focus on the new supranational institutions 
that had emerged in Europe, but rather examined historical cases to see if lessons 
could be applied to an area that included Western Europe, the USA, and Canada. 
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After comparison, they concluded that successful integration required a sense of 
community, a “we feeling” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 115).  
According to Deutsch et al. (1957: 117) a “Security Community is a group of people 
which has become integrated. By Integration we mean the attainment, within a 
territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough 
and widespread enough to assure for a, “long” time, dependable expectations of 
peaceful change among its population. By Sense of Community, we mean a belief 
on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least 
this one point: those common social problems must and can be resolved by 
processes of “peaceful change”. By Peaceful Change we mean the resolution of 
social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-
scale physical force”.  
A security community, “therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the 
members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their 
disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).  
Two varieties of security communities were observed. The first, an amalgamated 
security community means “the formal merger of two or more previously independent 
units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after 
amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. “The US today 
is an example of the amalgamated type” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6). The US became a 
single governmental unit through the formal merger of several previously 
independent units, which today has one supreme decision making centre.  
The pluralistic security community, “on the other hand, retains the legal 
independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States 
and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental 
units which form a security community without being merged” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 
6) and maintains two separate supreme decision making centres. However, the 
security community can only exist where the amalgamation occurs with integration.  
Altogether nine essential conditions were found in an amalgamated security 
community and a further three possible conditions were noted (these are not 
mentioned here as these are not applicable to the AU case which is deemed to be a 
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pluralistic security community). Importantly “of the twelve conditions that appeared to 
be essential for the success of an amalgamated security community, only two or 
three were found to be very important for a pluralistic security community as well” 
(Deutsch et al., 1957: 134).  
These include i) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-
making, ii) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond 
to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort 
to violence and iii) mutual predictability of behaviour (Deutsch et al., 1957: 134).  
Adler & Barnett (1998: 7) notes, “at the heart of Deutsch’s ‘pluralistic’ approach was 
the assumption that communication is the cement of social groups in general, and 
political communities in particular” (also see Political Community at the International 
Level, Deutsch, 1954 and The Integration of Political Communities, Jacob & Toscano 
(eds.), 1967).  
Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act 
together. The Deutschian model represents a process of integration based on a wide 
array of inter-societal transactions that are of mutual benefit to the people involved. 
The process is based on learning. Learning that such transactions provide benefits, 
that such benefits outweigh the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to 
continue such interactions and even expand them. As such, interactions occur and 
expand; the peoples involved become interdependent, and thus raise the costs of 
stopping such interactions (Starr, 1992: 210). 
In addition, as interactions occur and increase, people develop greater 
responsiveness to one another, and develop the expectation that wants and needs 
will be responded to positively. At some point, this produces the 'we-feeling', trust 
and mutual consideration that Deutsch calls community. This is the process of 
integration at the heart of the social communication model developed by Deutsch 
and the most tangible outcome of this process is the security community (Starr, 
1992: 211).  
This transactional approach was the manner in which Deutsch and his associates 
measured the “sense of a community”. They quantified transaction flows, with 
particular emphasis on their volume. A relative growth in transaction flows between 
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states, in contrast to flows within that state, was believed to be a crucial test for 
determining whether new “human communities” might be emerging.  
In addition, the transactionalist perspective, which takes seriously the possibility of 
community, offers an alternative understanding of international politics. Deutsch 
hypothesized that many of the same processes that led to national integration and 
nationalism in domestic politics might be equally relevant for international politics and 
international community development. “This simple move was quite radical, placing 
him at odds with how international relations theory generally evaluates the 
international system”. Most international relations theories use material forces, the 
language of power, and a very thin conception of society to understand interstate 
outcomes. In contrast, the Deutschian perspective relies on shared knowledge, 
ideational forces, and a dense normative environment (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 8).  
2.7 Adler & Barnett and Security Communities 
In their volume Security Communities Adler & Barnett (1998: 3) “thinks the 
unthinkable: that communities exist at the international level, that security politics is 
profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international 
community might develop a pacific disposition. In staking out this position we 
summon a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago: security 
communities”. Deutsch observed a pluralistic security community whenever states 
become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, which in turn 
creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war, that is not 
only a stable order, but in fact a stable peace.  
By marrying security and community, states are revising the conventional meanings 
of security and power. Some states are revising the concept of power to include the 
ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behaviour 
against an external threat and to attract new states with ideas that convey a sense of 
national security and material progress. Thus as the meaning and purpose of power 
begins to shift, so too does the meaning and purpose of security (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 4). 
Whereas once security meant military security, now states are identifying “new” 
security issues that revolve around economic, environmental, and social welfare 
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concerns and have ceased to concern themselves with military threats from others 
within the community. “There is emerging a transnational community of Deutschian 
policy-makers, if you will, who is challenging the once nearly hegemonic position of 
realist inspired policy-makers and offering an alternative understanding of what is 
possible in global politics and a map to get there” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 4).  
The concept of a community represents a direct challenge to the models of security 
politics that have dominated the discipline for the past several decades, and 
demands that we take seriously both sociological theorizing and the social character 
of global politics. “Simply put, the issue is not whether there is such a thing as an 
international community, but rather: when does it matter, where does it matter, and 
how does it matter? (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 5).  
“Notwithstanding the tremendous admiration for Deutsch’s scholarly and political 
vision his conceptualization was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and 
conceptual difficulties”. Therefore Adler & Barnett (1998: 5) offer a resuscitation of 
his concept of security communities after decades of neglect and criticism which is 
intended both to draw attention to the concepts importance and to suggest 
refinements to it  
To overcome these shortcomings they propose a number modifications and 
additions to Deutsch’s original schema, which includes a broader definition of the 
term security, and a differentiation between loosely, and tightly coupled pluralistic 
security communities. It also includes the division of the evolution of a security 
community into three stylized phases and an increasing attention to the mutually 
constitutive relationship between members and the community and the socializing 
effect of international organizations (Franke, 2008: 315).  
However, the constructivist reconceptualization goes much deeper than merely 
describing the three stages in the development of security communities. Now a 
security community has "shared identities, values, and meanings" (Adler and 
Barnett, 1998: 31). It is a "socially constructed," "imagined," or "cognitive" region, 
whose borders may or may not coincide with traditional geographical borders 
(Bellamy, 2004).  
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The term "imagined community," raised by Anderson (1983: 6), means that even 
though members of a community can hardly meet most of the other members, they 
still retain the mental image of their communion. A more traditional example of an 
imagined community is a nation-state, whose size generally prevents citizens from 
knowing each other in person. For this type of community, common identities and 
values are essential because ties between members cannot be based on face-to-
face interactions (Tusicisny, 2007: 427).  
Figure 1 illustrates the framework for the study of security communities, which is 
organised around three tiers: 
Figure 1. Framework for the Study of Security Communities 
 
TIER ONE 
Precipitating Conditions 
Change in technology, demography, economic, the environment 
Development of new interpretations of social reality 
External Threats 
TIER TWO 
Factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity 
Structure:  Power, Knowledge 
Process: Transactions, Organisations, Social learning 
TIER THREE 
Necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change 
Mutual trust 
Collective Identity 
=Dependable expectations of peaceful change 
 
Source: Adler & Barnett (1998: 38) 
2.7.1. Tier One 
Because of exogenous or endogenous factors, states begin to orient themselves in 
each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. These factors include: 
technological developments, an external threat that causes states to form alliances, 
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the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of 
social reality, transformations in economic, demographic and migration patterns or 
changes in the natural environment (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 38). 
There is no expectation that these initial encounters and acts of cooperation will 
produce trust or mutual identification, but because they are premised on the promise 
of more pleasant and more numerous interactions, they provide the necessary 
conditions for these very possibilities (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 38).  
In this initial or nascent phase, governments do not explicitly seek to create a 
security community. Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their 
relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs 
associated with their exchanges and encourage future exchanges (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 50).  
Accordingly, one would expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral 
exchanges, something akin to search missions that are aimed at determining the 
possible levels and extent of cooperation that might be achieved. In order to deepen 
and extend their interactions, to foster cooperation, and to verify in the absence of 
trust, states will frequently establish third parties to observe whether states are 
honouring their contract and obligations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).  
As noted, undoubtedly many possible trigger mechanisms initiate this initial search 
and the desire to create institutions or organizations to order and foster their 
relations. One is a mutual security threat. With a mutual security threat, states 
recognize or discover that they have joint interests that require collective action, and 
can mutually benefit from some modest coordination of security policies (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 50). 
The resulting acts of security cooperation are likely to include greater specification of 
those actions that are and are not considered threatening, policies that are designed 
to overcome collective action problems associated with independent choice, and the 
development of security programs that are intended to serve their mutual interests. 
Yet states frequently develop close security ties to not only provide for collective 
defence against a common threat, but also to deepen the institutional and 
transnational linkages that bind these together, capitalize on particular visions of 
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better material progress, and to promote ideas about cooperative security (Adler & 
Barnet, 1998: 50).  
The existence of or the desire to capitalize on the gains from trade can also 
encourage the development of international organizations and institutions. This is a 
standing argument of neoliberal institutionalism. However, here we anticipate that 
there will be a relationship between the establishment of international economic 
associations that are designed to encourage economic interchange, and the 
presence of international arrangements that are intended to produce order and 
security (Adler & Barnet, 1998: 51). 
Cultural, political, social and ideological homogeneity can lead to greater interaction 
and association, and the development of new organizations and institutions. It may 
even create the desire, and the very expectation that it is possible, to develop a 
security community. People sharing cultural and social attributes across national 
borders frequently voice an interest in developing not simply a defensive strategic 
posture but rather an institutional form that is intended to give muscle to already 
existing expressions of mutual obligation. For example, Arab nationalism held that 
Arab states should deepen their security and political ties not only because of an 
external threat but also to nurture and develop a political community (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 51).  
In general, the trigger mechanisms for a security community are likely to have a 
material and normative bases. Other material and normative factors can include 
rapid shifts in the distribution of military power, cataclysmic events that cause 
changes in material structures, mindsets and sensibilities, new ways of thinking 
about organizing political life, and transnational, domestic or international processes 
that generate common interests. A security community “gets out of the gate” 
because of either push or pull factors that cause states to reconsider how to 
organize their relations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 52).  
2.7.2 Tier Two  
The defining feature of this tier is that states and their peoples have become involved 
in a series of social interactions that have begun to transform the environment in 
which they are embedded (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39).  Also referred to as the 
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ascendant phase it is defined by the increasingly dense networks, new institutions 
and organizations that reflect tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or 
decreased fear that the other represents a threat. It also includes cognitive structures 
that promote “seeing” and acting together, and therefore the deepening of the level 
of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage 
dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 53).  
This tier is divided into the “structural” categories of power and knowledge and the 
“process” categories of transactions, international organizations and institutions, and 
social learning (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39).  
2.7.2.1. Structure  
Power and knowledge are the structural girders for the development of a security 
community. According to Deutsch “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, 
economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the 
cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed” 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39).  
Power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers 
creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to 
enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that 
community. Thus, those powerful states that belong to the core do not create 
security per se, rather, because of the positive images of security or material 
progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security 
communities develop around them (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 40).  
Knowledge also constitutes part of the international structure, and in this instance, 
interest is in the cognitive structures (shared meanings and understandings). 
Specifically we are interested in those cognitive structures that facilitate practices 
that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity, and analytically tied to 
conflict and conflict resolution. At the present moment if scholars of international 
politics are asked to identify one set of political ideas and meanings that are attached 
to a security community it is liberalism and democracy (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 40).  
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2.7.2.2 Process 
The process categories involve transactions, international organizations and 
institutions, and social learning. A transaction can be defined as a “bounded 
communication between one actor and another. A transaction, therefore, admits 
various types of exchanges, including symbolic, economic, material, political and 
technological, and so on (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 41). 
International organizations and institutions contribute directly and indirectly to the 
development of security communities. Following Oran Young (in Adler & Barnett, 
1998), we distinguish between social institutions and formal organizations by 
defining social institutions as “social practises consisting of easily recognized roles 
coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations among the 
occupants of these roles”, and organizations as “material entities possessing 
physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment and budgets” (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 41).  
Security and non-security organizations can contribute to the development of trust, at 
the most intuitive level; they facilitate and encourage transactions and trust by 
establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce 
those norms. However, their trust-building properties extend beyond their monitoring 
capacities, for they also can encourage actors to discover their preferences, to 
reconceptualise who they are, and to re-imagine their social bonds (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 42).   
Organizations are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors 
learn and perhaps even “teach” others what their interpretations of the situation and 
normative understandings are.  International organizations may be conducive to the 
formation of mutual trust and collective identities, because of their often 
underestimated capacity to “engineer” the very conditions e.g. Cultural homogeneity, 
a belief in a common fate, and norms of unilateral self-constraint, that assist in their 
development (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 42-43).  
Also behind every innovative institution stand creative and farsighted political elites. 
Political elites that are connected to international organizations use them to promote 
new possibilities. As John Hall (in Adler & Barnett, 1998) argues “the creation of new 
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social identities by intellectuals, that is their capacity to link people across space so 
as to form a new community, is necessarily a rare historical phenomenon, but it is 
one the scholars of international relations need to take seriously” (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 43).  
While communication between peoples, learning processes, and the thickening of 
the social environment plays a crucial role in the evolution of political communities, 
these are but propensities until agents transform them into political reality through 
institutional and political power. This highlights the critical role of social learning, 
which can be described as “an active process or redefinition or reinterpretation of 
reality, that is what people consider real, possible and desirable, on the basis of new 
causal and normative knowledge” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 43).  
Social learning is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organizational 
settings, and core powers. During their transactions and social exchanges, people 
communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their 
normative expectations. Institutions promote the diffusion of meanings from country 
to country, may play an active role in the cultural and political selection of similar 
normative and epistemic understandings in different countries, and may help to 
transmit shared understanding from generation to generation (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 
44).  
Social learning may not be sufficient for the development of a security community 
unless this learning is connected to functional processes that are traceable to a 
general improvement in the state’s overall condition. This is why core powers are so 
important to the process. States that possess superior material power, international 
legitimacy, and have adopted norms and practises that are conducive to peaceful 
change tend to confer increased material and moral authority to the norms and 
practises they diffuse, and may also induce their political adoption and 
institutionalization (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45).  
In sum, this phase is defined by an intensive and extensive pattern of networks 
between states that is likely to be produced and be a product of various international 
institutions and organizations. Although functional organizations might help to 
encourage mutual trust, we look for changes in the organization and production of 
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security for both the primary mechanism by which this trust is produced and for its 
evidence. We expect that a core state or a coalition of states remain important for 
stabilizing and encouraging the further development of the security community (Adler 
& Barnett, 1998: 54-55).  
2.7.3 Tier Three 
The dynamic and positive relationships among the described variables are the 
wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity, which in turn are the 
proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45). 
In this mature phase, a threshold has been crossed, trust and identity exists, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for the members of this “region” to think only in 
instrumental ways and prepare for war among each other (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 
55). Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can 
strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on mutual 
identification. Because a minimal measure of mutual trust is needed for a collective 
identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to identity. Once some measure of 
trust develops, a collective identity is likely to reinforce and increase the depth of 
trust (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46).  
When international relations theorists turn their attention to trust they generally 
elevate how anarchy makes trust highly elusive if not impossible”. This is one reason 
why states establish international organizations and other means to monitor the 
behaviour of others. The very existence of dependable expectations of change 
suggests that states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to 
maintain trust, but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the others (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 46).   
Collective Identity in its simplest definition is the understanding of oneself in 
relationship to others. Identities are not only personal or psychological, but are 
social, as defined by actor’s interaction with and relationship to others. Therefore, all 
political identities are dependent on the actor’s interaction with others and placed 
within an institutional context. This relational perspective informs the view that 
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national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations and states 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998: 47).  
In the loosely coupled security community states identify positively with one another 
and proclaim a similar “way of life”. There are multiple and diverse mechanisms and 
patterns of interaction that reinforce and reproduce the security community; there is 
an informal governance system based on shared meanings and a collective identity; 
and while there remains conflicting interests, disagreements, and asymmetric 
bargaining, there is the expectation that states will practise self-constraint (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998:55).  
Evidence of the emergence of a security community can be found in various 
indicators that reflect a high degree of trust; a shared identity and future; low or no 
probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters; and the differentiation 
between those within from those outside the security community (Adler & Barnett, 
1998: 55).  
These indicators could possibly include multilateralism, where the decision-making 
procedure, conflict resolution, and processes of conflict adjudication are likely to be 
more consensual than in other types of interstate relations.  Unfortified borders, even 
though still present, border checks are undertaken to secure the state against threats 
other than an organized military invasion. Change in military planning which does not 
include those within the community as potential enemies during a military 
engagement and a common definition of the threat by the community (Adler & 
Barnett, 1998: 55-56).  
Conclusion  
This chapter provided the theoretical framework against which the research in this 
project will be conducted. It introduced an overview of the development of regional 
security, and conceptual analysis’ of the terms security and community. It also 
provided a description of the theory of constructivism and its function in regional 
security.   
Deutsch (1958) initially introduced Security Community Theory but, as noted, his 
conceptualization was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and conceptual 
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difficulties and therefore a resuscitation of his concept of security communities was 
needed.  
Adler & Barnett (1998) provides a revised version of Security Community Theory, 
which includes a “framework for the analysis of the development of security 
communities”. This framework was introduced and extensively discussed in this 
chapter utilizing their edited volume.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Security Community Theory, the OAU and the AU 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will utilize Adler & Barnett’s (1998) Security Community Theory to 
interrogate the development of a security community in Africa at the continental 
level, and more specifically, how (if indeed) the AU has contributed to this process.  
As Adler & Barnett (1998: 49) argues, “our understanding of the development of 
security communities can be broadly termed as social constructivist and path-
dependent. The notion that security communities are socially constructed means that 
they have a history, and therefore exhibit an evolutionary pattern that follows the 
direction of “the arrow of time”. Thus, one can trace backwards the institutionalization 
of dependable expectations of peaceful change, from when they merely are 
imagined to exist to the process that led to their development.  
This chapter will commence with a historical background on the formation of the 
OAU, its involvement in Africa, and its transformation into the AU. Thereafter a short 
introduction to the AU will be presented followed by a methodical interrogation of the 
development of a security community in Africa, and how (if indeed) the AU has 
contributed towards the development of an African Security Community. This 
methodical interrogation will follow the three tiers of the framework, starting at tier 
one. The chapter will end with concluding remarks.  
3.2 From the OAU to the AU 
The OAU was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their first 
taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the 
continent, they saw the danger posed by the division of language, culture and 
religion, by the economic inequalities, and by controversies over boundaries 
arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers. It quickly became apparent that a high degree of 
co-operation was necessary among the fledgling African states, if the continent was 
to survive as a viable economic and political entity. It was for the purpose of 
cooperation that the OAU was established (Cervenka, 1977: ix).  
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3.2.1. Formation of the OAU 
At the beginning of 1963, the African states were divided into three main political 
groups: the Casablanca group1, the Monrovia group2, and the Brazzaville twelve3. 
There were several reasons for the division. One of them was the disagreement of 
the Casablanca states with the UN policy in the Congo (Zaire), a policy supported by 
the states of the Monrovia group as well as the Brazzaville group. Another was the 
support of the Casablanca states for the Algerian independence struggle, which was 
strongly opposed by the Brazzaville states. The relationship was further strained by 
the differing opinions on the recognition of Mauritania, a member of the Monrovia 
group, and support for Morocco against this recognition (Cervenka, 1977: 1).  
The most significant difference was on the matter of African unity. The Casablanca 
group was convinced that political unity was a prerequisite for the subsequent 
integration of African economies, while the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups 
maintained that African unity should be approached through economic cooperation 
only. However, even though disagreements existed there was a similarity in the 
fundamental aims of the three groups. This was particular in those areas concerning 
decolonization, racial discrimination, maintenance of world peace, and the urgent 
need for economic cooperation between African states. Thus, despite the many 
divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all the independent African states, 
and each of the groups made frequent attempts to end the division (Cervenka, 1977: 
1).  
The signing of the Charter on 25 May 1963 establishing the OAU was quite an 
achievement considering the split into the three rival blocs. However, because of the 
deep divisions, the OAU represented a largely negative agreement, and 
consequently in the years following the signing of the Charter very little progress was 
made. Kwame Nkrumah’s call for continental unity was brushed aside and the 
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African leaders settled for a superficial unity that brought together African states but 
not Africa’s people. The OAU in no way affected the sovereignty of each 
independent state, and they were left free to pursue policies in which continental 
priorities were sacrificed to narrow national interests (Cervenka, 1977: ix). The 
operating philosophy of the OAU can best be described as “based on the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states” (Wiseman, 1984).  
The purpose of the Organization is stated in Article II (1). It is (a) to promote the unity 
and solidarity of the African states; (b) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation 
and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa; and (e) to promote international co-operation, having due 
regard to the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Regardless of the order of the purpose, the fact remained that the principal aim of 
the OAU was to free the African continent from colonialism, apartheid, and racial 
discrimination (Naldi, 1999: 4). 
 Article II (2) lists some of the major areas for cooperation among the Member States 
and provides the OAU with its reason d’être: (a) political and diplomatic cooperation; 
(b) economic cooperation, including transport and communication; (c) educational 
and cultural cooperation; (d) health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation; (e) 
scientific and technical cooperation; and (f) cooperation in defence and security.  
It is noticeable that political and military integration are hardly alluded to among the 
purpose of the OAU, although significant developments in these fields occurred. The 
African defence force, called for by Nkrumah, never materialized, but efforts such as 
OAU peace keeping became a major consideration as it sought to adopt local 
solutions to solve African conflicts. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution introduced in 1993 serves as a suitable example 
(Naldi, 1999: 5).   
3.2.2. Towards the AU  
The Pan-Africanist ideals that led to the creation of the OAU in 1963 proceeded from 
the idea of the African states as strong and united against colonial subjugation and 
racism, and working together to improve the lives of African people. By its fifteenth 
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anniversary, however, the OAU was sailing on rough waters. The only remaining 
issue uniting the OAU was the factor that caused its birth: apartheid in South Africa. 
Otherwise, the OAU was weak and disunited by the dispute over Western Sahara 
(involving Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and France), the Shaba rebellions (the 
attempted invasions of Zaire), the invasion of Benin, and the Ogaden war against 
Somalia. Overall, the organization was seen to have failed to respond to serious 
intra-African conflicts or to act as a pan-African body against foreign intervention 
(Packer & Rukare, 2002: 366).  
Although some significant positive changes in the African political landscape had 
occurred in the late 1970s (such as the fall of the regimes of Idi Amin, Jean-Bédel 
Bokassa, and Francisco Macias Nguema, and progress toward Zimbabwean 
independence and self- determination in Namibia), the OAU had little hand in them. 
It was hampered by the split between radical and conservative member states, 
combined with a worsening economic situation in most of them. Assessments 
around the time of its twentieth anniversary evinced an unsatisfactory record and 
pessimism about the future (Packer & Rukare, 2002: 366).  
By 1988, which celebrated twenty-five years of OAU existence, hardly any analysis 
of the organization was made without suggestions for reform, particularly because 
the contemporary challenges faced by the continent were no longer the same as 
those of 1963. A primary function of the organization (eradicating colonialism and 
establishing the independence of African nations) had been virtually completed. Only 
the situation in South Africa remained a preoccupation (Packard & Rukare, 2002: 
366).  
As noted with the end of the Cold War, the world completely changed, but Africa and 
the OAU did not. Africa became increasingly marginalized and the great powers 
increasingly declined to assume leading roles in promoting peace. Thus during the 
latter half of the 1990’s African states took a series of decisions to overhaul the 
continental organization, which led to the launch of the AU in 2002 (Engel & Porto, 
2010: 1).   
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3.2.3 Formation of the AU 
The years from 1999 to 2002 saw a gradual transformation of the OAU into what is 
now the AU (Mwanasali, 2003). A process that is best understood as a fusion of 
three projects, namely a Libyan quest for Pan-African unity, a Nigerian project the 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA), and a South African project for an African Renaissance (Tieku, 2004). 
“First, and apparently driving the transformation, was the grandiose and utterly 
unrealistic pan-African scheme of the Libyan dictator Gadaffi, who pursued the 
decision in 1999 to create a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, 
ideological, ethnic and national differences”. However, the flamboyant Libyan leader 
could not implement his plan without the support of Nigeria and South Africa, each of 
which had their own projects for which they wanted an all-African stamp of approval, 
in return for which they gave their support for the new union (Moller, 2009: 8).  
The Nigeria idea of a CSSDCA came out of the so-called “Kampala Movement” 
(Deng and Zartman, 2002), and was envisioned as a counterpart of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSSDCA was based on a very 
broad concept of security, including human security, and acknowledged good 
governance as a pre-requisite of stable peace. As a means to realise these values, it 
envisaged “a collective continental architecture for promoting security and inter-
African relations”, and recommended the signing of non-aggression pacts, a 
common defence policy for Africa, stand-by arrangement for peace support 
operations, police collaboration, the establishment of an early warning mechanism 
as well as a strengthening of confidence-building measures. Most of these 
recommendations were formally confirmed at the inaugural AU summit in Durban in 
2002 (Moller, 2009: 8).  
South Africa’s project was the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). Based on the vision of an African Renaissance, it was first called the “New 
Africa Initiative”, dating back to the OAU summit in 1999. The main objectives were 
poverty eradication and sustainable development, but as a precondition for such 
development it also featured a “Peace, Security, Democracy and Political 
Governance Initiative” (Moller, 2009: 9).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za


A grand bargain had thus been struck between the “neo-Casablancans”, personified 
by the grandiose and populist Gadaffi, and the pragmatic “neo-Monrovians”, 
personified by Obasanjo and Mbeki: that is, three of the continent’s potential 
hegemons. This cleared the path for the launch of a new organisation. Following a 
hectic drafting process, 53 African Heads of State signed the Constitutive Act of the 
AU4 in July 2000 (Maluwa, 2003). This allowed for the solemn proclamation of the 
AU at an extraordinary Summit of the OAU in March 2001, and its solemn 
inauguration at a July 2002 summit in Durban (Cilliers, 2002).  
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act sets out the principles according to which the AU 
shall function (Juma, 2006: 49-50):  
a. Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union; 
b. Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence; 
c. Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union; 
d. Establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent; 
e. Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through 
such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly; 
f. Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of 
the Union; 
g. Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; 
h. The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
by the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war, genocides 
and crimes against humanity5;  
i. Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and 
security; 
j. The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to 
restore peace and security; 
k. Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union; 
l. Promotion of gender equality; 
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m. Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance; 
n. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; 
o. Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity 
and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; 
p. Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.  
Desmond Orjiako (in Mathews, 2008: 33) describes the AU as “a political, economic 
and social project aimed at creating a democratic space across Africa, promoting 
economic development, and for reflecting a common African identity”. The AU seeks 
to promote a more integrated and cooperative continent. Unlike its predecessor, it 
has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states in grave 
circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and is 
tasked with ensuring respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance (Mathews, 2008: 33).  
3.3 The AU: Tier One  
As noted, in the nascent phase governments do not explicitly seek to create a 
security community. Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their 
relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs 
associated with their exchanges and encourage future exchanges. Accordingly, one 
would expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges, something 
akin to search missions that are aimed at determining the possible levels and extent 
of cooperation that might be achieved. In order to deepen and extend their 
interactions, to foster cooperation, and to verify in the absence of trust, states will 
frequently establish third parties to observe whether states are honouring their 
contract and obligations (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 50).  
Briefly presented here are examples of the nascent phase as it “developed” in other 
regions that today are considered as security communities. In addition, examples 
from SADC on which a substantial amount of scholarly work exists is included, and 
finally a representation of the possible development of a security community in 
Africa.  
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3.3.1 Examples from other Regions: EU and ASEAN 
Western Europe is a security community and the EU is deemed the principal 
example of a security community. Contrary to most contemporary theorists of 
security communities, this has not been achieved by erecting common security 
structures or institutions, but primarily through a process of “desecuritization”, that is 
progressive demarginalization of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues 
(Weaver, 1998: 69).  
The process of security community formation does not match the three-phase model 
presented in this study. However, the nascent phase (of the EU) is marked by 
institution building (e.g. NATO) and motivated by both mutual and common external 
security concerns (Weaver, 1998: 91). These include i) the Soviet Threat; ii) an 
internal political threat, the Communists; iii) the economy; iv) the German question; 
and v) a historical argument: Europe had to make a choice to change course from 
wars to integration (Weaver, 1998: 81-82).   
In Southeast Asia, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have not fought a war against each other since 1967. This has 
promulgated Amitav Acharya (1991, 1998, and 2009) to argue in favour of the 
existence of a security community within the region. Using the theory as presented 
by Deutsch (1957) and Adler & Barnett (1998), Acharya has been able to trace the 
development of this community. He explains that the founding of ASEAN 
immediately followed the end of Indonesia’s policy of “Confrontation” against newly 
independent Malaysia and Singapore, which had proved costly for Indonesia’s 
economic development and the region's stability. Thus, preventing a repetition of 
such interstate confrontation and developing a mechanism for the pacific settlement 
of disputes were major considerations behind ASEAN’s formation (Acharya, 1998: 
203).  
ASEAN was also a product of shared threat perceptions. Yet, the threat was not 
necessarily external. The important factor behind the evolution of ASEAN 
regionalism was a common sense of vulnerability to the enemy within, particularly 
the threat of communist insurgency. This threat was magnified by the possibility of 
external backing from China and Vietnam. Singapore and Thailand viewed Vietnam 
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as a major security threat, while Indonesia and Malaysia saw China as most 
dangerous (Acharya, 1998: 203).  
This led to mutual cooperation against the trans-border movement of communist 
guerrillas, including intelligence sharing, mutual extradition treaties, and joint border 
patrols and counterinsurgency operations that served as an important basis for intra-
ASEAN solidarity (Acharya, 1998: 203).  
ASEAN’s origins were also influenced by the desire of its members to enhance 
economic cooperation for mutual gain. Inspired by the integration project in Europe 
ASEAN was conceived as a framework which would allow its members to preserve 
their independence and advance their national interests, rather than promote supra-
nationalism. ASEAN opted against EU-style trade liberalization that could 
compromise locally less advanced economies, in favour of improving its external 
economic climate through collective bargaining with its major trading partners 
(Acharya, 1998: 204).  
However, the outlined political (responding to an external threat) and economic 
imperatives, while important, were not sufficient to trigger the process of community 
building in ASEAN (Acharya, 1998: 205). Without a constructivist understanding, it 
would be difficult to explain the emergence of ASEAN. Community building involves 
a certain convergence of values. In the case of ASEAN, anti-communism (but not 
necessarily an adherence to liberal democracy), and a general preference for 
capitalist economic development (albeit state controlled) over the socialist model, 
served as important factors binding an otherwise diverse membership. Against this 
backdrop (which was supported by the West) ASEAN regionalism developed as a 
highly deliberate process of elite socialisation involving the creation of norms, 
principles, and symbols aimed at the management of diversity and the development 
of substantive regional cooperation (Acharya, 1998: 207). 
3.3.2 African Example: SADC  
In the early 1990’s, the Southern Africa region emerged from protracted conflicts 
which were primarily connected to the Cold War and apartheid destabilization. The 
first evidence of a community within Southern Africa started with the creation of the 
Frontline States (FLS) in the early 1970’s and the Southern African Development 
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Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. The FLS was a loosely structured 
security coordination forum for post-colonial states in Southern Africa. The 
objectives, or raison d’être, was to achieve the region’s economic liberation from 
apartheid South African dominance (in response to a mutual threat), and to 
coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (economic incentive) (Hwang, 
2007: 67). However, neither the FLS nor the SADCC put integration, either economic 
or political, on the agenda (Hammerstad, 2005: 72).  
The SADCC is seen as an important development in regional cooperation. It existed 
parallel to, but separate, from the FLS. The SADCC consisted of nine black ruled 
states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and was later joined by 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe) and was chaired by Sir Seretse Khama 
of Botswana. The SADCC was set-up as a loose formation of states with a shared 
geography and a shared denominator, namely a programme of action to achieve 
closer economic and transport integration among its members to reduce their 
dependence on South Africa (Swart & Du Plessis, 2004: 28-29). Notably after 1990 
these states together with South Africa would form the core of SADC.  
The transition of the post-Cold War era during the 1990’s has had profound 
implications for the position of the Third World in global politics, which resulted from 
systemic changes in both the international and national levels. The replacement of 
the bipolar system for a US dominated unipolar system weakened the presence and 
superpower “rivalry” that dominated the continent before. In many cases, but not all, 
this created the space for political settlement and resolution of many perennial 
issues, allowing local security dynamics to develop their own course and to operate 
more based on domestic resources and issues, rather than a function of ideology 
based Cold War politics (Swart & Du Plessis, 2004: 14).   
Following the end of the Cold War and the system of Apartheid in August 1992, at a 
Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, the Heads of State and Government signed the 
SADC Treaty and Declaration that effectively transformed the SADCC into SADC 
(Hammerstad, 2005: 72). The pressure of globalization, post-Apartheid euphoria and 
a growing feeling of disappointment and distrust drove a shift away from 
universalism, opting instead to look for regional solutions for political, economic and 
military problems in Southern Africa (Franke, 2008: 326).  
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Adler and Barnett (1998) explain that the nascent phase of the security community 
does not exhibit an explicit search for a security community per se but rather a desire 
to coordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions. The formation 
of the FLS and SADCC, and the later formation of SADC are evidence, and definitely 
include an important “other contributing factor” in the desire for a stable economic 
environment.   
3.3.3 Precipitating Conditions in Africa 
“At first glance, neither the concept of security communities nor any other of the 
concepts of security cooperation currently in the academic discourse seem 
applicable to Africa’s emerging security architecture” (Franke, 2008: 317). However, 
a “desire to co-ordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions” 
were visible early after the start of the decolonisation process in Africa. The first of 
these states to “break the shackles” of colonial rule was Ghana (1957) and its leader 
Kwame Nkrumah was an adamant follower of Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah in 1963 
already called for a “United States of Africa”, a continental organisation with a 
common currency, one army and a central government. Even though Nkrumah 
played a pivotal role in the formation of the OAU, his call for a complete integration of 
Africa was rejected as expressed in the final arrangements of the OAU. However, it 
should still be viewed as an important contribution in the overall progress to the 
achievement of a “sense of community in Africa”. Nkrumah did not stand alone in his 
“vision” for a unified Africa, as Nyerere (1963: 1) explains, “there is one sense in 
which African unity already exists. There is a sentiment of “African-ness” a feeling of 
mutual involvement”.  
The OAU was not the only regional organisation that existed, and since its formation 
in 1963 leading to the post-Cold War period in the 1990’s several regional 
arrangements developed. This illustrates the desire to coordinate actions and 
increase interaction and cooperation. Some of the most important and influential 
efforts include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1986, the East African 
Community (EAC) in 1967, the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) in 1981, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989 (Franke, 2009).  
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During this period, it can be argued that, it was the “internal threat” of colonialism, or 
rather the elimination thereof that acted as a precipitating condition for member 
states to be drawn to one another. This was epitomised by the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa, which was established in 1948 and served as the final “colonial 
stronghold” until 1990. Additionally, a realisation of the economic benefits of 
integration served as an important contributing factor e.g. IGAD, ECOWAS and the 
EAC.  
However the OAU never achieved a “full” integration of the continent, ironically it was 
the organisation itself, though its promotion “of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of member states” that hindered closer cooperation, and by the 1990’s many 
shortcomings of the organisation had been exposed. Also in the 1990’s we saw the 
end of the Cold War, and the demise of Apartheid. The former rearranging the entire 
world system, from bi-polar to unipolar in favour of the US, and bringing an end to 
ideological conflicts in Africa, whilst the latter meant the “death” of colonialism in 
Africa, and the emancipation of the African people. As Swart & Du Plessis (2004) 
have noted, “the end of the Cold War meant that Africans no longer received the 
international attention they had enjoyed previously as Africa’s geopolitical and 
strategic importance dwindled, which included a decrease in financial and military 
support”.  
The decade that followed could best be described as a “decade of awakening” 
(Franke, 2006: 12). The catastrophe in Mogadishu, which saw a withdrawal of the 
US from direct peacekeeping operations in Africa, the genocide in Rwanda where 
the international community failed to intervene, and the impact of globalization on 
African economies brought Africans to the realisation that it could no longer entrust 
its future to the international community. Henceforth, “African solutions had to be 
found to African problems”. 
As Franke (2008: 319) explains “driven by a growing sense of urgency and a feeling 
of disappointment and distrust in the international community and its motives, 
capabilities, and willingness to get involved in African affairs, that the continent's 
leaders realized that if they want to break the cycle of violence, poverty and 
underdevelopment they had to cooperate with each other and together take charge 
of the continent's destiny”. What ensued has been described as the fifth wave of 
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Pan-Africanism characterized by a slow conceptual shift from regime security and its 
sacrosanct principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity to the broader notion of 
human security (Franke, 2008: 319). Africa has reached the nascent phase. 
3.4 The AU: Tier Two 
The ascendant phase sees the development of intensive and extensive pattern of 
networks between states that is said to result in the emergence of various 
international institutions and organisations. Dense ‘friendly’ networks that continue to 
develop, the development of structures that show increased military coordination and 
cooperation and/or a reduction of fear by members of the emerging community that 
other members represent a threat, characterise the phase (Ngoma, 2005: 48).  
This phase is divided into two categories: structure and process.  
3.4.1. Structure 
The structural category consists of two parts. Power is central for understanding the 
development of security communities, and plays an important role in its development 
and maintenance. Deutsch (1957) argues, “larger, stronger, more politically, 
administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found 
to form the cores of strength around which most cases the integrative cases 
developed”. 
Following the realisation that henceforth Africa will have to find “African solutions, to 
African problems” three states emerged as critical/power players in the ascendant 
phase. As presented earlier in this project, the call for greater African unity was 
spearheaded by three leaders, each with their own specific project, and arguably 
each with their own national interests at heart (Tieku, 2004).  
President Mbeki from South Africa (the regional hegemon in the SADC) “nourished 
the hopes for an African Renaissance as first introduced in his famous “I am an 
African” speech to South Africa’s Constitutional Assembly in May 1996. Mbeki’s 
“vision” “provided a useful counterpoint to the Afro-Pessimism of the days” (Franke, 
2008: 319).  
President Obasanjo of Nigeria (the regional hegemon in ECOWAS) introduced a 
reform package, which was articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
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on the CSSDCA. “In specific terms, the reforms provided benchmarks for judging the 
behaviour of African leaders in four issue areas: security, stability, development, and 
cooperation. These principles were meant to redefine security and sovereignty, and 
to demand certain standards of behaviour... from every government [in Africa] in the 
interest of common humanity” (Tieku, 2004: 256). 
“Sensing that the two most powerful African leaders were teaming up to reform the 
OAU, President Gaddafi from Libya (considered a potential African hegemon, see 
Powell, 2009) intervened” (Tieku, 2004: 260).  Gaddafi called for an extraordinary 
summit in Sirte, Libya from 6 to 9 September 1999. The Libyan leader wanted to use 
the platform of the summit to cement his full return to the geopolitics of black Africa, 
and to demonstrate his renewed commitment to the Pan-Africanism project. 
Surprisingly, Gaddafi presented to the 33 African leaders attending the Sirte summit 
his plan for a “United States of Africa”. This plan included the creation of a 
continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single military force, and a 
common African currency (Tieku, 2004: 261).  
A grand bargain was thus struck between the grandiose and populist Gadaffi, and 
the pragmatic Obasanjo and Mbeki: that is, three of the continent’s potential 
hegemons (Moller, 2009: 8). From this “power” bargain, we see the emergence of 
the AU as orchestrated mainly by these three states.  
The second part of the structural category is knowledge. As Adler & Barnett (1998: 
40) comments that “here we are interested in cognitive structures, that is shared 
meanings and understandings... (especially) those cognitive structures that facilitate 
practises that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity, and 
analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution”.  
The formation of the AU in 2002 was a crucial and important step towards the 
development of an African security community. This development, as previously 
stated, was promulgated by the changing conditions (both at international, 
continental and local level) in Africa, and facilitated by the regional hegemons South 
Africa, Nigeria and potential hegemon Libya. The transition from the OAU to the AU 
included a new “set of rules” in the form of the Constitutive Act as set out in its 
objectives and principles. Thus, the Constitutive Act can be viewed as the single 
most important contributor to the creation of “new knowledge”, and the AU as a norm 
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entrepreneur, on the continent, and crucially by adopting this Act the 53 African 
states acknowledged and accepted this “new knowledge”.  
When considering “those cognitive structures that facilitate practises that are tied to 
the development of mutual trust and identity...” one should consider Article 3 and 4 of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 3 (a) to achieve greater unity; 3 (b) 
defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; 
and 3 (f) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. Article 4 (d) the 
establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent; 4 (e) peaceful 
resolution of conflicts among Member States; 4 (f) prohibition of the use of force or 
threat to use force among Member States; 4 (m) respect for democratic principles; 
and 4 (q) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government 
(Juma, 2006: 49-50).  
Additionally, at the 2002 Durban summit “to enable the organization to carry out its 
new peace and security mandate, and provide operational structure for the effective 
implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-
making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and 
post-conflict reconstruction”, the AU adopted The Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC 
Protocol) (Engel & Porto, 2010: 3).  
However, this has only been the initial step towards the creation of knowledge as the 
AU has continued to act as a norm entrepreneur on the continent through the 
adoption of several agreements, protocols, treaties and conventions (see Powell, 
2005; Williams, 2007; Vreÿ, 2008; Engel & Porto, 2010; AU, 2011a). One such an 
addition was the agreement on a Common African Defense Policy (CADSP) during 
the second extraordinary session in Sirte, February 2004. The CADSP, clearly, 
under section I (Definition and Scope) define the concept of defence, the concept of 
security, and define “common security threats” (Juma, 2006: 84-85). Engel & Porto 
(2010: 3) notes, “this policy, in addition to the PSC Protocol, forms the legal 
underpinning of the continent’s peace and security architecture”.  
In 2007, the AU made another major contribution as “norm entrepreneur” with the 
introduction of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (AU, 
2007a). The charter is “inspired by the objectives and principles obtained in the 
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Constitutive Act”... “particularly those which emphasize the significance of good 
governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights”. The objectives 
under Article 2 of the Charter include: 1) Promote adherence, by each State Party, to 
the universal values and principles of democracy... 3) Promote the holding of free 
and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority... 4) prohibit, reject and 
condemn unconstitutional changes of government  (AU, 2007a).  
Article 11 dictates, “the State Parties undertake to develop the necessary legislative 
and policy frameworks to establish and strengthen a culture of democracy and 
peace. Importantly, the Charter includes under Art.23-26 the prescribed actions to be 
taken by the AU and member states should any member contravene the 
arrangements set out in this charter (AU, 2007a).  
3.4.2 Process 
The process categories involve transactions, international organizations and 
institutions, and social learning. Transactions can be defined as a “bounded 
communication between one actor and another” and “admits various types of 
exchanges, including: symbolic, economic, material, political and technological 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998: 41).  
Transactional interactions between African states existed prior to the establishment 
of AU, but were hindered by the internal divisions amongst member states. The AU, 
in contrast, has committed itself to promote cooperation. This is set out in Article 3 
(c) accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent; 3 (e) 
encourage international cooperation; 3 (j) promote sustainable development at the 
economic, social and cultural levels, as well as the integration of African economies; 
3 (k) promote cooperation in all fields of human activity; and 3 (l) co-ordinate and 
harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities (REC’s).  
Furthermore this commitment is promoted through the various AU organs e.g. The 
Pan-African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the 
Financial Institutions. Also since 2002, the AU has held various summits, the most 
recent 17th Summit for Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development from 23 
June to 1 July 2011 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (AU, 2011b). These arrangements 
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have not remained dormant, but have made considerable contributions to 
cooperation on the continent.  
Such contributions include the establishment of the Association of African Trade 
Promotion Organizations (AATPO), which “fosters contact, and regular flow of 
information and communication between African countries in trade matters and 
assist in the harmonization of the commercial policies of African countries in order to 
promote intra-African trade” (AU, 2010a). The Bamako convention “which controls 
the trans-boundary movement of hazardous wastes in Africa” and the Convention of 
the African Energy Commission (AFREC) to cooperate in “the area of energy among 
Member States, particularly through the joint development of energy resources and 
identification and promotion of regional and/or sub-regional projects” (AU, 2006).  
Several other conventions, charters and statutes are currently under review, which 
would enhance cooperation in the fields of maritime transport, civil aviation, and the 
protection and assistance of internally displaced persons (AU, 2011a).  
The second category under process is international organizations and institutions. 
Following the work in this study, it can convincingly be illustrated that the AU is the 
principal contributor. The introduction of the Constitutive Act, the adoption of the 
PSC protocol, and the addition of the CADSP serves as the most prominent 
examples, but previously there have been no elaboration on the objectives and 
principles of these arrangements.  
The two most important objectives of the PSC Protocol that relates to the 
development of a security community, is given under Article 3 and 4. Under Article 3 
(a) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the 
protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people 
and their environment; and 3 (e) develop a common defense policy for the Union. 
The most important principles under Article 4 are (a) the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and conflicts, and (d) interdependence between the socioeconomic 
development and the security of peoples and States.  
Sturman& Hayatou (in Engel & Porto, 2010: 146) “consider that the PSC has been 
central to the reforms of the OAU into the AU, changing both procedures and norms. 
The PSC can recommend interventions with or without the consent of the member 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	

state in which conflict takes place and approve the modalities for such interventions. 
Furthermore, it may recommend sanctions against unconstitutional changes of 
government”.  
Article 11 of the PSC Protocol introduces the Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the 
Wise “shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various 
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of 
peace, security and development on the continent”. They shall be appointed by the 
Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States, and be 
representative of the various regions. The Panel shall advise the PSC and the 
Chairperson of the Commission on all issues related to the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (Juma, 2006: 72).  
Article 12 of the PSC protocol introduces the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS) that shall facilitate “the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”.  
Article 13 of the PSC protocol introduces the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF 
will enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of 
peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of the 
Constitutive Act. The ASF shall be composed of multidisciplinary standby 
contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin, and 
would be ready for rapid deployment (Juma, 2006: 73).   
The adoption of the CADSP is premised on a common African perception of what is 
required to be done collectively by African States to ensure that Africa’s common 
defence and security interests and goals are safeguarded in the face of common 
threats to the continent as a whole (Juma, 2006: 84).  
As noticed earlier it includes conceptualizations for the terms defence and security. 
According to the policy defence shall “encompass both the traditional, military and 
state-centric notion of the use... as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects 
which relate to the protection of peoples political, cultural, social and economic 
values and ways of life” (Juma, 2006: 85).  
Similarly, security encompasses “both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the 
survival of the state and its protection by military from external threats... as well as 
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the non-military notion that is informed by the new international environment and the 
high incidence of intra-state conflict (Juma, 2006: 85).  
Another significant institution, which has evolved with the AU, is President Thabo 
Mbeki’s brainchild, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. NEPAD was 
adopted in October 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria, and the framework document points to 
security, democracy and good political, economic and corporate governance as the 
conditions for sustainable development (Juma, 2006: 56).  
As a socioeconomic programme of the AU, NEPAD’s primary objective is to 
eradicate poverty in Africa through the establishment of stable peace and security 
conditions, and promote sustainable economic growth and development, which will 
enhance Africa’s participation in global political and economic affairs (AU, 2004a).  
NEPAD is designed to address the current challenges facing the African continent. 
Programmes, which have been developed, include the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme, which aims to assist the launching of a “green 
revolution” in Africa, based on a belief in the key role of agriculture in development; 
and the NEPAD Science and Technology programme, which includes an emphasis 
on research in areas such as water science and energy. Other programmes include 
the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund by the Public Investment 
Corporation of South Africa, which finances high priority cross-border infrastructure 
projects and capacity building for continental institutions that works with the African 
Capacity Building Foundation, the Southern Africa Trust, UNECA, the African 
Development Bank, and other development partners (NEPAD, 2011).  
In 2003, NEPAD launched the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to monitor 
and assess compliance of African governments with the norms of governance and 
human rights articulated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The intention of 
the APRM is to promote peace and security through mutual trust. African leaders 
and governments are also held accountable through governance, which promotes 
transparency and good governance as ingredients of peace and stability, according 
to the objectives of the CADSP (Thobane, 2007: 51).  
The final category under process is social learning. “Social learning plays a critical 
role in the emergence of security communities, and is facilitated by transactions that 
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typically occur in organizational settings” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 44). The AU, 
through its numerous organs, summits, and regional arrangements are able to 
facilitate social exchanges through which people communicate to each other their 
perceptions of reality and self-understanding. As a result the understanding and 
perceptions can be altered, and collective shared normative values are formed which 
inevitably leads to collective identity formation (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 44).  
The institutions of the AU also disseminate information e.g. Norms and values to the 
various regions and countries on the continent which in turn can choose to accept 
and adopt these norms. This aids in the transmission of a shared understanding from 
generation to generation. Most notably the AU’s stand on good governance based 
on democratic principles and the legal transition of power, which is guarded by the 
AU’s right to intervene under Article 4 (h).  
The AU is able to connect this learning to a functional process that promises a 
general improvement on the current conditions in Africa. Crucially regional 
hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria support this process, by adopting the 
norms and practises of the AU, and promoting it across the continent. This 
commitment of regional powers, whom themselves have adopted and practise these 
norms and values in their countries, legitimises the process and its meaning resulting 
in the attraction of smaller States which aspire to uphold similar norms and values.  
“In general, social learning explains why transactions and institutional actions can 
encourage the development of mutual trust and collective identity. By promoting the 
development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international 
action, and regional boundaries, social learning encourages political actors to see 
others as trustworthy. And it also leads to people to identify with those who were 
once on the other side of cognitive ideas” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 45).   
3.5 The AU: Tier Three 
Franke (2008: 322) argues, “it appears (from the above) that the evolutionary pattern 
of inter-African cooperation indeed corresponds to the approximate growth path of a 
security community as outlined by Adler & Barnett”. The foundations for an African 
security community were laid when the “trigger mechanism” induced closer 
cooperation (tier one)... shared meanings and understandings continued to evolve 
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over the following decade, and these foundations were strengthened and 
cooperation deepened (tier two). What remains is the verification of the actual 
emergence of a security community in Africa (tier three).  
Adler and Barnett define the ‘mature’ phase as one where regional actors “share an 
identity” and a belief that peaceful change is inevitable, consequently paving the way 
for the existence of a security community which is typified in two versions: loosely 
coupled and tightly coupled security communities. The loosely coupled security 
community (as discussed in this study) is characterised by mutual respect and 
acknowledgement by the states that they lead the same way of life (Ngoma, 2005: 
49).  
The states are seen as having “an informal governance system” which is premised 
on “shared meanings and collective identity” regardless of having interests which are 
at odds with one another (Ngoma, 2005: 50). The AU and its organs in Africa provide 
the framework for such “an informal governance system”. Evidence of the 
emergence of a security community can be found in various indicators that reflect 
this high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that 
conflicts will lead to military encounters, and the differentiation between those within 
from those outside the security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55).  
The mature phase is divided into two categories: collective identity and mutual trust.  
3.5.1. Collective Identity  
A collective identity for the African continent is not a novel idea. Kwame Nkrumah in 
as early as 1963 called for a collective identity through the development of a “United 
States of Africa” with a singular Union Government. But, for Africa it was only with 
the pressures of the post-Cold War environment combined with a new found support 
of Pan-Africanist ideology which promoted the emergence of a shared 
developmentalist project and a common (security) culture (Franke, 2008: 323).  
The AU and its organs embody this project, which was formed in 2002. As Desmond 
Orjiako and Mathews (2008: 33) describes the AU is “a political, economic and social 
project aimed at creating a democratic space across Africa, promoting economic 
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development, and for reflecting a common African identity. It seeks to promote a 
more integrated and cooperative continent”.  
This African identity formation process is enshrined in the articles of AU’s 
Constitutive Act, the NEPAD Framework, the AU PSC, and the CADSP. These 
articles facilitate this process of identity formation through, for example, the provision 
of common African position on a range of issues such as debt relief, access to 
Western markets, and a permanent African seat in the UN security council.  
Most notably, in the Accra declaration, “the Heads of State and Government of the 
African Union, meeting at our 9th Ordinary Session in Accra, Ghana, from 1 to 3 July 
2007 agree to accelerate the economic and political integration of the African 
continent, including the formation of a Union Government for Africa with the ultimate 
objective of creating the United States of Africa” (AU, 2007b).  
To this extent the AU is “to rationalize and strengthen the Regional Economic 
Communities, and harmonize their activities, in conformity with our earlier decision, 
so as to lead to the creation of an African Common Market, through the stages set in 
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), with a 
reviewed and shorter timeframe to be agreed upon in order to accelerate the 
economic and, where possible, political integration” (AU, 2007b).  
Even though there obviously remain substantial differences in political and economic 
values among the continent's states, the resultant increase in transnational 
exchanges, policy coordination, and common institutions helped to reinforce a 
shared identity, form compatible core values, and deduce collective purposes 
(Franke, 2008: 323).  
In order to encourage an increasing conformity in political, economic, and corporate 
governance values, codes and standards (which forms part of the identity formation 
process) Africa’s states have, as discussed, also agreed on the establishment of the 
APRM, as part of NEPAD (Franke, 2008: 324).  
Arguably, the most explicit example of an African identity is the number of joint AU 
peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union. 
Regardless of the success or failure of these missions, their part and importance in 
this process need to be mentioned. The missions include the AU mission in Burundi 
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(AMIB) in 2003 which was the “first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed 
by AU members” (Franke, 2009: 115). The “AU’s heads of state and government 
was enthusiastic about the revival of continental cooperation and eager to put an end 
to the long running crisis” (Franke, 2009: 116). This mission consisted of 3 335 
personnel with military contingents from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and 
Mozambique (228), as well as an observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, 
Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (Franke, 2009: 117).  
Another mission is the AMIS in 2004, which by 2005 consisted of 6 170 military 
personnel and 1 560 civilian police members from Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, 
Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya and Gambia, with smaller contribution from several 
other African nations (Moller, 2009: 14). The AU also conducted three peace support 
missions (AMISEC, MAES, and Operation Democracy) in the Comoros from the 
2006 to 2008. Again, these missions involved several thousands of AU military and 
civilian personnel supplied by several AU member states (Franke, 2009: 123-127).  
The AMISOM, which was officially launched in 2007, is the only AU mission that is 
still ongoing (In 2008 the AMIS was replaced by a hybrid AU-UN mission, UNAMID). 
By December 2007, AMISOM’s numbers had reached 3 400 personnel with the 
majority of contributions made by Uganda, and a minor contribution from Burundi 
(Franke, 2009: 127-130).  
3.5.2 Mutual Trust  
International Relations theorists regard the formation of international organisations 
and structures for monitoring states as premised on the generalisation that “anarchy 
makes trust highly elusive if not impossible”. They contend that the security 
community thesis, implying the “existence of dependable expectations of peaceful 
change”, is a negation of the dominant international relations dogma and a 
calculated undertaking that “states no longer rely on concrete international 
organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the 
other” (Ngoma, 2005: 59).  
However, Adler and Barnett regard trust as “believing despite uncertainty” and argue 
that there is a close relationship between trust and collective identity in that “there is 
a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification” (Ngoma, 2005: 59).  
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They introduce NATO as an example. Other nuclear powers do not feel threatened 
by each other’s nuclear weapons, even when France withdrew from the NATO 
integrated command and insisted on maintaining an independent nuclear force. 
Other NATO allies did not view this as a military threat against physical survival, yet 
they are threatened when states such as Iran and Iraq possess nuclear capabilities 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46).  
Again, the AU can be viewed as the principal promoter of trust through the articles of 
the Constitutive Act, the PSC, and CADSP. This is evident in the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union Article 3 (a) achieve greater unity and solidarity..., (c) accelerate 
the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent, (j) ...integration of 
African economies, and (k) promote co-operation in all fields (Juma, 2006, 49).  
The PSC is a relatively new international institution with a remit dedicated to 
promoting peace, security and stability on the African continent. It is “a standing 
decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts 
that should be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely 
and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. The PSC has fifteen 
members elected by the AU Executive Council that the entire Union trusts for 
decision-making. Also in contrast to the UNSC the PSC members are elected 
according to the principle of “equitable regional representation and rotation” with no 
permanent members. All members have equal rights, there is no veto power, and the 
preferred method of decision-making is by consensus. By March 2009, the PSC had 
held over 180 meetings, issued over 100 communiqué’s, imposed sanctions against 
regimes in several African states (including Togo, Mauritania, Guinea and 
Madagascar), and authorised peace operations in Sudan, the Comoros (three times) 
and Somalia (Williams, 2009: 603-609).  
The CADSP is a common understanding between African states about their defence 
and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to 
respond to those challenges. Its underlying notions are a common understanding of 
the concepts of defence, security and common threats. Touray (2005: 643) explains, 
“the objectives of the CADSP are essential to respond to both internal and external 
threats effectively. In particular, they are to enhance defence cooperation between 
and among African states, eliminate suspicion and rivalry between them, enhance 
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the collective defence and strategic ability as well as military preparedness of 
member states of the Union..., and encourage the conclusion and ratification of 
nonaggression pacts between and among AU member states”.  
Further, the level of mutual trust that exists amongst AU members is evident in the 
CEWS, the ASF and the various joint military exercises that have been held. These 
are all instances where military strategic and confidential information are shared 
amongst member states, which can be considered sensitive to national security.  
The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled based on open source 
information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis 
for PSC decisions, particularly for the possible deployment of the ASF. It consists of 
two components: (1) an observation and monitoring Centre (The Situation Room) at 
the AU headquarters; and (2) parallel observation and monitoring units at the sub-
regional level, which are supposed to link up to the Situation Room (Wulf & Debiel, 
2009: 14). Franke (2009: 206) note, “in general, it seems fair to say that the 
operationalization of the CEWS and its regional component mechanisms is a 
promising sign of intensifying inter-African cooperation”.  
The AU established the ASF to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with 
respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to 
Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (Cilliers & Pottgieter, 2010: 111). 
Conceptually, the ASF is based on three levels, the continental level (AU), the 
regional level (REC’s), and the national level (member states) (Franke, 2009: 158).  
Franke (2009: 176-177) argues that “the establishment of the regional brigades and 
their continental coordination mechanism necessitates an extraordinary high level of 
interstate cooperation”... and “in order to ensure that the various national contingents 
follow standardized operating procedures, states not only have to raise the level of 
interaction between their military decision-makers and institutionalize some sort of 
working relationship, but also collaborate in extremely sensitive areas such as 
Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence and Surveillance systems”. 
This symbiotic relationship reduces the risk of competition between the continental, 
regional, and national levels of inter-African security cooperation.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter utilized the framework for the analysis of the development of security 
communities to evaluate the contribution of the AU to the development of an African 
security community. From the discussion in this chapter it becomes apparent that the 
AU, despite heavy critique and pessimism, has indeed made significant 
contributions.  
The precipitating conditions for the development of an African security community 
can be explained as: the failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, the end of the 
Cold War and the new arrangement of the post-Cold war international system, a 
general disinterest from the West in the post-Cold War period with regards to African 
security affairs, the political and economic benefits of “acting” as one, and the 
realization by African leaders that in the future “African problems” will have to be met 
with “African solutions”. It can be argued that the AU was a direct consequence of 
the precipitating conditions, and an expression of the intent and purpose of the 
African leaders.  
The AU’s role becomes especially significant in tier two. It facilitated both the 
categories of the ascendant phase: structure and process. The regional hegemons 
South Africa and Nigeria, as well as potential hegemon Libya, was able to deliver 
their grandeur visions for Africa through the AU. It also served as a site where 
knowledge could be disseminated and in itself as a norm entrepreneur. In the 
process category it facilitated, and even accelerated transactions between states; 
acted as an organization and introduced new organizations and institutions; and 
again served as a site for social learning among the various member states.  
Finally, the dynamic and positive relationships among the variables are the 
wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity. This African identity formation 
process is enshrined in the articles of AU’s Constitutive Act, the NEPAD Framework, 
the AU PSC, and the CADSP. It can be argued that these articles facilitate this 
process of identity formation. In addition, the Accra declaration is significant 
evidence of the continued pursuit of a singular African identity, and the most explicit 
example of the existence of an African identity is the number of joint AU 
peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union.  
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These peacekeeping missions, which involve intensive military cooperation and the 
sharing of sensitive information, are also evidence of the level of mutual trust that 
exists among the member states of the AU. Again, this points to the AU as a 
principal promoter of trust. The promotion of trust by the AU is also evident in the 
articles of the Constitutive Act, the PSC and CADSP. For example, the CADSP is a 
common understanding between African states about their defence and security 
challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those 
challenges and includes a common understanding of the concepts of defence, 
security and common threats. Another example is the ASF, which because of its 
composition necessitates an extraordinary high level of interstate cooperation, and 
collaboration in extremely sensitive areas such as Command, Control, 
Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance systems.  
In chapter 4, “theory will be put into practise” by introducing three case studies from 
Africa in which the contributions of the AU towards the development of an African 
security community is illustrated.  
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Chapter 4 
The AU: Theory into Practise 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will extend the discussion of this research project beyond the theory by 
introducing and evaluating three case studies in which the AU has thus far been 
involved. An appraisal of key AU decisions and documents, as was done in previous 
chapters, is not a sufficient assessment of the contribution of the AU to continental 
security, and therefore these case studies aim to provide examples and illustrate the 
AU’s involvement.  
The first case study is the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB was the 
AU’s first deployment of military forces after its inception in 2002. At this point, the 
AU was eager to get involved, but inexperienced, and this led to several mistakes. 
However, many regard the AMIB as a success. The second case study is the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS followed shortly upon the completion of AMIB, 
and the AU was as before eager to prove its willingness to get involved. However, 
not learning from AMIB several key “beginners” mistakes were repeated, especially 
in mission planning, which meant that the mission could never properly get off the 
ground. AMIS was heavily criticised for its performance, and was eventually replaced 
by an AU/UN hybrid mission UNAMID. The third case study is the recent post-
election political crisis Côte d’Ivoire. President Gbagbo refused to transfer the 
presidency to president-elect Mr. Ouattara after losing a second round run-off 
election on 28 November 2010. This led to swift condemnation from ECOWAS, the 
AU, the UN and other international actors. After several mediation attempts by 
African heads of state and a threat of military intervention from Nigeria under the 
banner of ECOWAS failed, Gbagbo was arrested and removed from power by a 
French and UN military intervention.   
Each case study will provide a short historical background of the circumstances, the 
actions taken by the AU in response to the circumstances, the results from the AU’s 
intervention and involvement, and the contribution made by the AU concerning 
greater continental security. The chapter will close with Table 1, which provides a 
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summation of the contribution of the AU to the development of an African Security 
Community.  
4.2 The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
Burundi has since independence, experienced repeated clashes between Hutu and 
Tutsi groups. Despite the fact that the country is made up of an 85 percent Hutu 
majority, the Tutsi minority of around 15 percent has enjoyed disproportionate levels 
of power since the country’s independence in 1962 (Svensson, 2008: 8). For 
example, the government and Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) were Tutsi dominated. 
The uneven power distribution, often exploited by the Tutsi leadership, has been 
responsible for a series of Hutu uprisings (Rodt, 2011: 6).  
When a multiparty system was introduced in 1992, some attempts were made to run 
the country democratically. However, the assassination of the first democratically 
elected president, the Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, led to renewed violence. After 
Melchior’s successor, Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira and Rwandan President 
Juvénal Habyarimana were killed when their plane was shot down over Kigali, the 
Great Lakes region were thrown into turmoil. In Burundi an estimated 300 000 
people, most of them civilian, were killed. Across the border, an estimated 800 000 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in the Rwandan genocide (Svensson, 2008: 
8-9).  
Regional efforts to restore peace in Burundi began when former Tanzanian 
President Julius Nyerere convened meetings between the Hutu FRODEBU and Tutsi 
UPRONA in 1996. As these initial efforts failed, Nyerere proposed a summit in 
Arusha for the regional Heads of State to discuss the situation in Burundi. Tanzania 
and Uganda sought to persuade Burundi to accept a regional peacekeeping force, 
but the Burundi army resisted (Rodt, 2011: 7).  
After attempts to reach an internal settlement failed, Burundi agreed to join a second 
round of talks in Arusha. The Presidents of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania 
all took part in these negotiations. When Nyerere died in 1999, former South African 
President Nelson Mandela took over as chief negotiator. This marked the beginning 
of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process (Rodt, 2011: 8) 
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The Arusha Agreement made provision for an international peacekeeping force in 
Burundi. The October 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Transitional 
Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Armed Political Parties and Movements 
(APPMs) stressed that the truce should be verified and controlled by a peacekeeping 
mission, either mandated by the UN or undertaken by the AU. The ceasefire 
agreement signed in December 2002 confirmed that the AU should conduct such an 
operation (Rodt, 2011: 9).  
The 2003 AU peace operation in Burundi, also known as AMIB, was the first 
operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members. It represented a 
milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing 
peace building (Murithi, 2008: 75).  
4.2.1 Reaction by the AU  
The AMIB was the AU’s first deployment of military forces.  The Central Organ of the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, approved the mission in 2003. 
AMIB was mandated for one year and deployed from April 2003 to May 2004. It was 
an integrated mission comprising military contingents from Ethiopia, Mozambique 
and South Africa as well as observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and 
Tunisia (Rodt, 2011: 9).  
South Africa was the lead nation, deployed first. This was achieved quickly since the 
South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was already in Burundi 
(Svensson, 2008: 13). Mozambique initially committed one company of 228 persons 
to the mission. Ethiopia promised to provide one battalion and two additional 
companies, 858 persons in total. South Africa agreed to send one battalion, two 
additional companies and other elements, a total of 1 600 soldiers. Once fully 
deployed, the mission numbered 3 335 people (Rodt, 2011: 9). 
South Africa appointed Force Commander Major General Binda and Ethiopia 
assigned Deputy Force Commander Brigadier General Azele. Head of Mission 
Ambassador Mamadou Bah was also the Special Representative of the Chairperson 
of the Commission (Rodt, 2011: 9).  
The mandate clearly articulated the desired end-state of the mission: AMIB will have 
fulfilled its mandate after it has facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire 
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agreements, and the defence and security situation in Burundi is stable and well 
managed by newly created national defence and security structures.  
AMIB’s four main objectives were to: (a) supervise the implementation of the 
ceasefire agreements; (b) to support disarmament and demobilization initiatives and 
advise on the reintegration of combatants; (c) to create favourable conditions for the 
presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and (d) to contribute to political and 
economic stability in Burundi (Svensson, 2008: 11).  
4.2.2 Impact of the AU Intervention 
AMIB has been described as “one of the AU’s biggest success stories” (Boshoff, 
Vreÿ and Rautenbach, 2010: 69) and a number of senior military personnel, 
observers and analysts share this perception (Rodt, 2011: 11). AMIB had the task of 
establishing conditions that would allow a UN peace operation to enter the country. 
(The UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into 
conflict.) AMIB’s crucial role in this case was to create conditions through which 
peace, albeit fragile, could be built in the country (Murithi, 2008: 75).  
By the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most 
provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside Bujumbura where 
armed resistance, in the form of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), 
remained a problem. In the absence of the AU Mission Burundi would have been left 
to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent 
conflict (Murithi, 2008: 75).  
AMIB managed to stabilize Burundi to such an extent that the UN thought it possible 
to take over AMIB’s responsibilities one year on. The fact that the UN was reluctant 
to deploy a peacekeeping mission in the first place illustrates the precarious security 
situation in Burundi at the time of the AU deployment. The peace process and 
ceasefire agreements were fragile and not all parties to the conflict had consented to 
the presence of peacekeepers. There was a real chance that the country could 
return to full-scale violent conflict. Nonetheless, the AU intervened and AMIB 
successfully managed the violent aspect of the conflict (Rodt, 2011: 11-12). 
On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission in Burundi. On 1 June 2004 Kofi Annan, then UN secretary-
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general, appointed a special representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head 
the mission. The former AMIB troops were incorporated into the UN Peace 
Operation in Burundi (ONUB) (Murithi, 2008: 76).  
4.2.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security  
The interest of this research project is in the contribution of the AU towards the 
development of a security community and therefore the evidence from this case 
study should support this.  The evaluation can conclude that the AU did contribute to 
the processes in Tier Two or the Ascendant phase. The phase is defined by: 
increasingly dense networks; organizations that reflect greater military coordination 
and cooperation; cognitive structures that promote “seeing” and acting together, 
therefore the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective 
identities (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 53). The evidence also supports contributions of 
the AU to Tier Three or the mature phase. These include the institutionalization of 
expectations in both domestic and supranational settings, and a shared identity 
amongst members e.g. acting under the banner of the AU. 
AMIB achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent 
conflict and secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and 
ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, the UN deployment and future political 
progress and economic development in Burundi (Rodt, 2011: 14). Agoagye 
estimates that around 95% of Burundi was relatively stable when AMIB ended its 
mission (in Svensson, 2008: 15).  
 AMIB, the AU’s first military deployment since its inception in 2002, points to the 
commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems 
facing the continent. This task was undertaken even though the AU as a new 
continental organization had no previous experience. “AMIB is a sign of ambition 
from the AU members to deploy a mission when the UN is not able to, or does not 
want to become involved, in this case because there was no comprehensive peace 
agreement signed” (Svensson, 2008: 15).  
The mandate of the mission was not backed by the use of force, but instead the 
rules of engagement were based on self-defence and to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence. This emphasizes the AU’s commitment to find 
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peaceful solutions to African problems. “It constituted a clear mandate in accordance 
with UN principles and standards, international humanitarian law and the laws of 
armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough mandate for the AU troops to 
complete their mission to the extent that its resources allowed” (Rodt, 2011: 17).  
It also showed a commitment from various African states to become involved and 
assist. These include the troop contributing countries: South Africa, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique; and observer contributions from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and 
Tunisia. South Africa willingly assumed the responsibility of lead nation and 
contributed the necessary resources “to get the job done”. “It prepared for the AU 
mission, diplomatically and militarily. It provided essential resources such as funding, 
troops, equipment and logistics and made arrangements for procurement, 
maintenance, training and service of equipment” (Svensson, 2008: 17).  
The AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with the 
UN mission ONUB in 2004. The former AU troops were rehatted and initially were 
the only UN peacekeepers when the UN force generation process was delayed.  
4.3 The AU in Sudan (AMIS)  
“For many, this operation represented the biggest test case of the AU’s new 
peacekeeping ambitions, not only because of its sheer size but also because of the 
complexities of the conflict it was meant to solve” (Franke, 2009: 118). The root 
causes of the conflict extends back to the 17th century when Arab incursions led to 
the establishment of a sultanate amongst the indigenous Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
people of the region, and therefore defies easy analysis (Murithi, 2008: 76).  
Since independence in 1956, Sudan has seen more war than peace. Civil war raged 
from 1955 to 1972, and again from 1983 to 2005. These wars are generally 
described as a struggle over resources and power between the government in 
Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). They are also 
characterised as being waged by a predominantly Arab and Muslim North and a 
largely African and Christian South (Ekengard, 2006: 11). 
The most recent episode of the conflict began in February 2003, with the social and 
economic marginalisation of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum, which laid 
the foundations for rebellion (Murithi, 2008: 76). The main infrastructure for armed 
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resistance was tribal, but the largest segments Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit rarely 
coordinated. Rivalry between the two Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) leaders, Abdel 
Wahid al Nur and Minni Minawi became intense and bitter, and differences between 
these two and the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khalil 
Ibrahim, were significant. These divergences prevented the Darfur resistance from 
forming a united political front (De Waal, 2005: 1040)  The government retaliated 
with a combination of its own military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today 
known as the infamous Janjaweed (Murithi, 2008: 76).  
The Janjaweed is from a segment of Darfur’s camel-herding Arab tribes, and Arab 
immigrants from Chad, who had their own territorial ambitions in Darfur. The Sudan 
government made a deal with the Arab groups whereby they were allowed to pursue 
their own agenda with impunity, in return for suppressing the rebellion. Other 
Darfurian Arabs initially remained outside the conflict, though some joined the 
counterinsurgency in 2003 and others were drawn in the following year as the rebels 
took the war to the east and south of Darfur (De Waal, 2005: 1040).  
By early 2004, the escalating violence had already left tens of thousands dead and 
millions displaced from their homes. As the government of Sudan (GoS) under Omar 
al-Bashir at the time did not consent to a UN peace operation on its territory, it was 
left to African actors to play the leading role. Just as the mission in Burundi was 
winding down, the AU began to face the possibility of having to launch another 
operation. This became a reality when the GoS, the SLM/A and the JEM signed the 
so-called N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 8 April 2004; 
and the subsequent Addis Ababa Ceasefire Agreement (signed on 28 May 2004) 
called on the AU to monitor its implementation (Franke, 2009: 119).  
4.3.1 Reaction by the AU 
The Inter-Sudanese talks on Darfur, as the continued negotiations were officially 
called, were initiated in late March 2004. After initial GoS obstruction, the personal 
involvement of AU chairperson Alpha Konaré facilitated the HCFA.  
The parties agreed to (a) cease hostilities; (b) establish a Joint Commission (JC) and 
a Ceasefire Commission (CFC), which would be responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the HCFA; (c) release prisoners of war; (d) facilitate the delivery of 
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humanitarian assistance; and (e) create a team of military observers, with an 
attached protection force, to monitor the ceasefire. This force was named the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Ekengard, 2006:14).  
Following the signing of the HCFA in April, the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments of the African Union authorized the deployment of AMIS (Ekengard, 
2006: 17). Early in June, the AU deployed (later known as AMIS I) 80 observers and 
a small protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops to monitor, verify, 
investigate and report transgressions of the ceasefire agreement. The latter broke 
down as soon as the AU observers had arrived (Franke, 2009: 119). A major cause 
of the problems, which AMIS faced during its initial deployment, was deficient 
planning. This point is repeatedly mentioned by analysts as a major shortcoming of 
AMIS I. During a 2007 evaluation seminar, a former AMIS official said “AMIS was 
never planned: it just happened” (Ekengard, 2006: 18). 
The AU realized early on that AMIS did not have the resources to fulfil its tasks. A 
concrete suggestion for improvement was delivered in the report of the CFC 
Chairman to the PSC on 20 October 2004. This suggestion was to guide the 
composition of an expanded operation, known as AMIS II (Ekengard, 2006: 19). The 
PSC finally agreed to increase the number of AMIS personnel to 3 320 including a 
civilian police component of 815. Even though the AMIS II deployment was larger, it 
continued to face many obstacles and failed to enact any effective change as the 
situation in Darfur continued to worsen. The logistical position improved somewhat in 
January 2005 when the AU established the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), and 
received logistical support from the US firm Pacific Architectural Engineers (Franke, 
2009: 119).  
Based on the recommendation of an AU led assessment mission, the PSC 
authorized a further increase in the strength of AMIS to 6 170 military personnel and 
1 560 civilian personnel in April 2005. Known as AMIS IIE, the enhanced force was 
to “encourage improved compliance with the HCFA and create a secure environment 
for the IDP’s in and around the camps as well as for humanitarian relief services”. 
However, as with AMIS II an increase in the number of troops on the ground failed to 
translate into an improvement in the conditions on the ground. By January 2006, a 
report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission had to conclude that there had 
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been an escalation in the number of ceasefire violations since August 2005 and that 
the security situation had further deteriorated with attacks on AMIS becoming more 
frequent (Franke, 2009: 120). In total 59 soldiers died while serving in the AMIS 
(Ekengard, 2006: 24). 
The same report also asked the members of the PSC to consider possible 
alternatives to AMIS IIE given the increasing difficulties in securing sufficient funding 
for the operation. Realizing the dire situation of AMIS, the PSC used its 45th meeting 
on 12 January 2006 to express its support for a transition from AMIS to a UN 
operation (Franke, 2009: 120).  
4.3.2 Impact of the AU Intervention 
After three and a half years in the Darfur region, there was still no viable peace to be 
found. It is evident that the combined efforts to create peace have failed and the 
efforts of AMIS have not been sufficient, and unlike AMIB did not achieve any 
considerable success. Franke (2009: 121) notes that the “critics are right that the 
troops on the ground cannot be blamed for these failures. Rather, the problems were 
caused by a combination of structural conditions like a severe lack of financial, 
military, and institutional resources and a dangerous defiance of well-established 
peacekeeping principles like the need for diligent planning, a workable political 
settlement, and a clear mandate”.  
Beginning with planning the ad hoc nature of AMIS and its rapid evolution from a 
simple observer mission to a full-blown peacekeeping operation led to what 
peacekeeping professionals were quick to label as “beginner's mistakes”. Every 
single phase of AMIS (I, II & IIE) was put together in a rush and as a result there was 
little time for proper planning “AMIS was never planned, it just happened”. Together 
with a notable absence of strategic guidance, this lack of planning caused 
widespread problems ranging from the implementation of inefficient structures to the 
absence of a clear division of labour between mission components. While the quality 
of planning did improve somewhat with the creation of the DITF and the addition of 
international experts, AMIS was never able to shed its quintessentially reactive 
character and assume initiative (Franke: 2009: 121).  
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As AMIS was not based on a viable political settlement, the AU forced its troops to 
engage in “wider peacekeeping tasks” in the midst of a live war-zone. As noted by 
Williams (in Ekengard, 2006: 30), “there was no room in the mandate for AMIS to 
take on the underlying political causes of the conflict in Darfur, the marginalization of 
Darfur as a region or the politically induced ethnic tensions”. Literally caught in the 
crossfire of constantly shifting factions, AMIS soon began to suffer its first casualties 
as it was increasingly seen (and treated) as just another participant in the war rather 
than as the neutral facilitator of peace it should have been according to standard 
peacekeeping doctrine (Franke, 2009: 122).  
The insufficiency of the mandate given to AMIS is one of the most frequent criticisms 
raised against the mission. As the legal basis for military actions, the mandate is a 
natural benchmark against which to judge a peace operation. In the brief period from 
the deployment of AMIS I until the reinforcements authorized as AMIS II started 
arriving, there seems to have existed two main problems with the mandate. First, 
while the mission was to monitor a ceasefire, the parties did not respect the 
ceasefire, and therefore no ceasefire existed to monitor. Second, the resources 
available to AMIS were far from enough to fulfil the very limited mandate entrusted to 
the mission (Ekengard, 2006: 25).  
With the introduction of AMIS II, the PSC also introduced a new mandate. Whereas 
AMIS I had a straightforward mandate, the AMIS II mandate was a lengthy list filled 
with reservations (Ekengard, 2006: 26). The constantly changing nature and 
imprecise formulation of its mandates led to substantial confusion within AMIS. So 
dismal was the situation that after another expansion of the AMIS mandate that even 
the AU Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, had to admit that the new AMIS mandate “was 
not clearly understood by commanders at all levels” (Franke, 2009: 122).  
Like AMIB before it, AMIS was under funded from the very start. The shortfalls in 
funding went hand in hand with a lack of critical force enablers such as vehicles, 
strategic transportation and communication equipment. Given the sheer size of 
Darfur and the absence of a road network and other infrastructure, the lack of 
sufficient air assets proved particularly detrimental to the missions overall 
effectiveness. Overall, the AU was unable to secure the type of long-term funding 
that would have allowed it to address these critical shortfalls, leaving Chairman 
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Konaré to conclude, “the AMIS experience has demonstrated the difficulty to mount 
large peace support operations for a long period of time without reliable sources of 
funding (Franke, 2009: 123).  
Franke (2009: 123) concludes that, concerning results, that “during its three and a 
half years in the field, AMIS demonstrated the growing willingness of the AU to get 
involved in the continent's conflicts; however, it proved unable to bring peace to 
Darfur”.  
4.3.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security  
The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. “A 
member state was actively directing murder and displacement against parts of its 
own population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military 
operation against the will of the state in question. At that time, the AU was still in the 
process of designing its fundamental architecture for conflict management. When 
evaluating AMIS, this perspective should be kept in mind” (Ekengard, 2006: 47).  
The concern of this research project is with the contribution of the AU towards a 
security community and therefore the evidence from this case study should support 
this.  The evaluation of this case can conclude that the AU did indeed contribute at 
both the ascendant and the mature phase.  
Even though the AMIB had just been completed, the AU again did not refrain from 
getting involved in yet another African conflict. The chairperson of the AU Alpha 
Konaré facilitated the ceasefire agreement personally, “Alpha Konaré blazed the 
diplomatic trail to Darfur” (Adebajo, 2008: 136), and the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Governments of the AU was quick to authorize the deployment of AMIS. The AU 
commission “made the crisis in Darfur a central priority, as it poses the first major 
challenge to the recently established PSC”, and Konaré commented that “the AU is 
duty bound to play a leading role in resolving [the] crisis” (Powell, 2005: 42). 
Similar to the AMIB several African states were willing and in the position (Powell, 
2005: 44) to become involved with major contributions from: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, 
South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya; and other contributions from: 
Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Zambia, Lesotho, Uganda, Madagascar, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Mauritius. Even with the transition from AU (AMIS) to a hybrid 
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AU/UN (UNAMID) mission the majority of troops (89%), civilian police (66%), and 
military observers (82%) were comprised of African personnel (Moller, 2009: 14). 
Even though “the PSC might have been grateful to hand over some of the logistical 
and financial burden of the mission to the UN, the African Member States are 
expected to retain a degree of political leadership over the current mission” (Sturman 
& Hayatou, 2010: 70).    
A significant contribution of the AU in the AMIS case is its reason for intervening. As 
suggested by Ekengard (2006) “the outside world called for the AU to launch a 
military operation in Sudan” as it believed the GoS were committing acts of 
genocide.  
By admitting the existence of these acts, the AU would be obligated to intervene 
under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act which gives “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of 
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity 
(Juma, 2006: 50). Article 4 (h) is one of the major norm shifts the AU has introduced 
and promoted since its inception in 2002.  
However, the AU failed to acknowledge acts of genocide or grave circumstances in 
Darfur (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 84), or in other regions of Sudan. Instead, it noted 
that “even though the humanitarian situation in Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined 
as genocide” ..., but it did reiterate “its serious concern over the prevailing situation in 
the Darfur region of the Sudan, particularly the humanitarian crisis and the continued 
reports of human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians committed by the 
Janjaweed” (AU, 2004b).  
Even though the situation did not, according to the AU, warrant intervention under 
Article 4 (h) the AU continued to seek a resolution and to this extent authorized 
AMIS, which would later become AMIS II, AMIS IIE and eventually UNAMID. This 
illustrates the AU’s continued support to uphold peace and stability, and even 
authorised an intervention in the affairs of a Member State to broker peace and 
provide humanitarian assistance. “This sense of responsibility and activism on the 
part of the AU represents a clear shift from the OAU’s de facto policy of “non-
intervention” to the AU’s commitment to “non-indifference” (Powell, 2005: 42).  
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Although this was the second peace operation to be undertaken by the AU, it seems 
few lessons were learned from peacekeeping experiences in Burundi. It is 
unfortunate that the AU did not learn from AMIB on how to deploy faster and more 
effectively, acquire adequate funding, better coordination between units and between 
the military and political units of the mission, better coordination from the AU 
headquarters, better information sharing and better civil-military relations” (Makinda 
& Okumu, 2008: 87).  
4.4 The AU in Côte d’Ivoire  
Côte d’Ivoire’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, ruled from independence in 
1960 until his death in 1993. Henri Konan Bédié, assumed power and won a 
fraudulent election in 1995. General Robert Guéï seized power in 1999 and declared 
himself the winner of an October 2000 presidential election after initial results 
showed that he was losing to opposition politician Laurent Gbagbo. A popular 
uprising soon toppled Guéï, and Gbagbo, who was eventually declared the winner, 
refused to call new polls. The post-election violence cost hundreds of civilian lives 
and deepened the divisions between north and south as well as between Muslims 
and Christians (Freedom House, 2011).  
Civil war erupted in September 2002 when around 700 soldiers mounted a coup 
attempt, and government forces killed Guéï under unclear circumstances on the first 
day of fighting. Rebel forces quickly took control of the north and called for Gbagbo 
to step down. Other rebels in the west echoed this call. By December 2002, the rebel 
factions had united to form the New Forces (FN), led by Guillaume Soro (Freedom 
House, 2011). 
Gbagbo’s government and the FN signed a French-brokered ceasefire in 2003, but it 
soon broke down. In 2004, following the deaths of nine French peacekeepers in a 
government bombing campaign against the FN, France destroyed the Ivorian air 
force, and with the backing of the AU, persuaded the UNSC to impose a strict arms 
embargo on the country. In April 2005, South African president Thabo Mbeki 
brokered a new peace accord that set general elections for the end of that year. 
Because the requisite disarmament and poll preparations were not completed in 
time, the AU postponed the elections, extended Gbagbo’s term, and appointed an 
interim prime minister, economist Charles Konan Banny (Freedom House, 2011). 
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Similar delays prevented elections from taking place in 2006. With the expiration of 
Gbagbo’s extended mandate in October, the UNSC passed a resolution transferring 
all political and military power to the prime minister until the next elections. Gbagbo 
refused to accept the move and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
(Freedom House, 2011). 
In March 2007, Gbagbo and Soro met in Burkina Faso and signed an entirely new 
peace deal, the Ouagadougou Political Accord (APO), according to which Soro was 
appointed interim prime minister until elections could be held. Gbagbo soon visited 
the north for the first time since 2002, and the “confidence zone” separating the two 
parts of the country was officially dismantled (Freedom House, 2011). 
Despite the more peaceful climate, the elections envisioned in the APO were 
postponed five times over the next three years. In February 2010, Gbagbo 
unilaterally suspended voter registration and dissolved the government and the 
electoral commission, accusing the commission of partisanship. This brought 
thousands of people, particularly in the north and from Abidjan, to the streets in 
protest. A new head of the electoral commission and a new cabinet had been 
appointed by April, and in September the registration process yielded an official voter 
list of 5.8 million people, including 500 000 new voters (Freedom House, 2011). 
The first round of the presidential election, held on 31 October, was deemed 
relatively free and fair by domestic and international observers. Gbagbo led with 38 
percent of the vote, and Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) party placed 
second with 32 percent. Bédié of the PDCI-RDA, who came in third with 25 percent, 
threw his support behind Ouattara ahead of the 28 November runoff election 
(Freedom House, 2011). 
The day of the runoff was relatively peaceful, and the UN and EU observers 
generally approved of the polling, but violence increased considerably during the 
period before the results were officially announced. On 2 December, the electoral 
commission, backed by the UN, formally announced that Ouattara had won with 54 
percent of the vote (Freedom House, 2011). 
The Constitutional Council, which was made up of Gbagbo loyalists, quickly annulled 
the results from largely pro-Ouattara northern districts, alleging widespread fraud. It 
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then announced that Gbagbo had won with 51 percent. The government closed the 
country’s borders and banned all broadcasts of international news, as the 
international community formed a united front in pressing Gbagbo to concede to 
Ouattara. By 4 December, both Gbagbo and Ouattara had been sworn in as 
president in separate, conflicting ceremonies. The standoff remained unresolved at 
year’s end, with escalating violence between the two sides causing dozens of deaths 
(Freedom House, 2011). 
4.4.1 Reaction by the AU  
International responses to the post-election violence in Ivory Coast were very swift 
and significant. The “unanimity with which president Gbagbo was condemned, 
isolated, and sanctioned by the international community makes his case very 
different from recent situations in Africa. The response carried the strong message 
that instability in Africa and its resultant consequences can no longer be tolerated”. 
What makes the international pressure especially heavy for Gbagbo is the fact that 
his own peers in Africa also turned against him (Fowale, 2010).  
Africa’s first response to the political crisis was an Extraordinary Session of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, which was held on 7 
December 2010 in Abuja, under the Chairmanship of Dr Goodluck Jonathan, 
President of Nigeria (ECOWAS, 2010a).  
During their deliberations, the Authority reviewed the political and security situation 
arising from the declaration of the results of the second round of the Presidential 
elections in Côte d’Ivoire. They were also briefed by the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire. After a thorough review of the 
situation, the Authority expressed “deep concern over the threats posed to the 
success of the peace process leading to a lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis” 
(ECOWAS, 2010a). 
Reaffirming their commitment to the relevant provisions and principles of the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the Heads of State and 
Government “condemned in strong terms, the attempt to go against the will of the 
Ivorian people as freely expressed on 28 November 2010”. In order to protect the 
legitimacy of the electoral process, the Summit “endorsed the results declared by the 
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IEC and certified by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN 
in Côte d’Ivoire in accordance with Resolution 1765 of the UNSC, dated 16 July 
2007”. In this regard, the Heads of State and Government “recognized Mr. Alassane 
Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire” (ECOWAS, 2010a). 
The Summit called on Mr. Laurent Gbagbo to abide by the results of the second 
round of Presidential elections as certified by UNOCI, and to yield power 
immediately, in the best interest of the Ivorian People. The Summit decided to apply 
the provisions of Article 45 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance relating to the imposition of sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire, including the 
suspension from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies until further notice 
(ECOWAS, 2010a). 
As part of the AU’s initial response, former South African President Thabo Mbeki 
was requested to intervene. Mbeki arrived in the Ivorian city of Abidjan on 5 
December “entrusted by the AU to find a legitimate and peaceful solution to the 
crisis". Mbeki held crisis talks with Côte d’Ivoire’s incumbent president Gbagbo and 
president elect Mr. Ouattara in an attempt to mediate the political crisis. Mbeki 
commented, "it is important not to have violence, not to return to war, to find a 
peaceful solution" Mbeki’s mediation attempts received mixed responses, but 
ultimately failed to find any solution (BBC, 2010).  
Mbeki’s mediation attempt was followed by several more attempts under the 
direction of the AU and was headed on different occasions by different African heads 
of state. The continued mediation efforts “indicates our [the AU] determination to 
explore all the options making it possible to resolve in a peaceful and consensual 
manner the crisis that threatens the survival, even the existence, of Ivory Coast’. The 
AU explained that this “issue was linked to regional stability and the preservation of 
the democratic characteristics of our continent" (BBC, 2010). Diplomatic efforts 
between November 2010 and early March 2011 were not on their own sufficient to 
persuade Gbagbo to relinquish power, but they undoubtedly diminished his political 
authority both inside and outside the country (Watt, 2011: 1).  
The international community strongly backed the legitimacy of Mr. Ouattara's victory, 
with the UN and the EU unconditionally supporting the AU and ECOWAS, and 
recognizing him as the duly elected leader of Côte d'Ivoire. On 20 December 2010, 
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the UNSC at its 6458 meeting adopted Resolution 1962 (2010). The resolution 
condemned “in the strongest possible terms the attempts to usurp the will of the 
people and undermine the integrity of the electoral process and any progress in the 
peace process in Côte d’Ivoire”. In addition, it welcomed “the decisions of the 
ECOWAS Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government 
on Côte d’Ivoire held in Abuja on 7 December 2010 and the decisions of the 252nd 
meeting of the AU PSC”. Finally the UNSC urged “all the Ivorian parties and 
stakeholders to respect the will of the people and the outcome of the election in view 
of ECOWAS and AU’s recognition of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as President-elect 
of Côte d’Ivoire” (UN, 2010).  
The PSC of the AU, at its 252nd meeting, held on 9 December 2010, endorsed the 
final communiqué on Cote d'Ivoire of the ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria on 
7 December 2010. The AU recognized the results proclaimed by the IEC, as certified 
by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the UN, pursuant to 
Resolution 1765 (2007) of the UNSC of 16 July 2007, and Mr. Alassane Ouattara as 
the PresidentElect of Côte d'Ivoire (AU, 2010b).  
Also on the basis of relevant AU instruments, the “AU suspended6 the participation 
of Côte d’Ivoire in all AU activities, until such a time the democraticallyelected 
President effectively assumes State power”. In addition they “strongly urged Mr. 
Laurent Gbagbo to respect the results of the election and to facilitate, without delay, 
the transfer of power to the PresidentElect, in the best interest of Côte d'Ivoire, the 
region and Africa as a whole” (AU, 2010b).  
The initial ECOWAS response was followed by a second Extraordinary Session, 
which was held on Friday, 24 December 2010 in Abuja. At this session the members 
present “expressed deep concern over the fast deteriorating political and security 
environment in Côte d’Ivoire characterized by escalating violence, the use of 
mercenaries to perpetrate atrocities, loss of life, and the heightening of ethnic 
tensions, as well as the threat of civil war, with its negative consequences on 
regional peace and security”. They also “expressed deep concern over the 
unacceptably high number of lives lost since 7 December 2010 and warned all those 
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responsible that they will face an international trial for human rights violations at the 
earliest opportunity” (ECOWAS, 2010b). 
The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the travel ban, 
freeze on financial assets and all other forms of targeted sanctions imposed by 
regional institutions and the international community on the outgoing President and 
his associates, and would support any future additional measures that may be taken 
in this direction (ECOWAS, 2010b).  
The ECOWAS authority “also regrets the fact that the message sent by the 
ECOWAS Chairman on behalf of the Authority on 17 December 2010 has not been 
heeded by Mr. Gbagbo. In this season of peace, the Summit decided to make an 
ultimate gesture to Mr. Gbagbo by urging him to make a peaceful exit. In this regard, 
the Authority decided to dispatch a special high-level delegation to Côte d’Ivoire” 
(ECOWAS, 2010b). 
In the event that Mr. Gbagbo fails to heed this immutable demand of ECOWAS, “the 
Community would be left with no alternative but to take other measures, including 
the use of legitimate force, to achieve the goals of the Ivorian people. Against the 
background of the parlous security situation, the Heads of State and Government 
instructed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to convene without delay a 
meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff in order to plan future actions, 
including the provision of security along the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border, in the event 
that their message is not heeded” (ECOWAS, 2010b). 
In January 2011, Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia stated that, with the 
support of ECOWAS and the AU, that Nigeria would “request UN backing for military 
intervention in Ivory Coast to prevent it slipping into a civil war that could destabilise 
the West African region. Ajumogobia continued, "it is clear that Gbagbo is 
determined to defy and treat the entire international community with absolute 
disdain... He cannot, he must not be allowed to prevail..." and "Gbagbo must be 
made to understand that there is a very real prospect of overwhelming military 
capability bearing down on him and his cohorts". (allAfrica, 2011).  
Ajumogobia said, “force did not necessarily mean an incursion into the former 
French colony, legitimate force can include, for example, a naval blockade to enforce 
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sanctions which might be imposed against Gbagbo. We cannot leave Ouattara to 
enforce the legitimate and internationally recognised mandate given to him by the 
people of Côte d'Ivoire. That would be to sanction civil war, against the very ethos of 
the UN. (allAfrica, 2011).  
4.4.2 Impact of the AU Intervention 
On 11 April 2011, following military operations conducted by forces loyal to President 
Alassane Ouattara, UNOCI and French Licorne troops, Mr. Gbagbo was arrested 
and placed in the custody of President Ouattara’s Government (UN, 2011). 
Gbagbo’s capture spurred a rapid decrease in the scale of combat and associated 
casualties and human rights abuses, but sporadic fighting continued in subsequent 
weeks, primarily in a few areas of Abidjan (Cook, 2011: 8).  
On 21 April, the PSC of the AU reinstated Côte d’Ivoire’s membership in the 
organization, which had been suspended due to the Gbagbo government’s failure to 
heed the internationally recognized electoral outcome or comply with AU decisions 
regarding efforts to resolve the crisis (Cook, 2011: 5).  
On 28 April, in a move aimed at bolstering the stability and the consolidation of 
peace in Côte d’Ivoire, the UNSC enacted Resolution 1980. The resolution urged 
that disarmament efforts be prioritised and reaffirmed UNOCI's role in collecting and 
interdicting illicit arms, called for regional security coordination efforts, and stressed 
that it would closely monitor efforts to violate the sanctions it had imposed (Cook, 
2011: 5).  
On 6 May, Mr. Alassane Ouattara was sworn in as President of Côte d’Ivoire. He 
took the oath of office at a ceremony at the presidential palace in Abidjan a day after 
the Côte d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council ratified the results of a presidential election 
showing that Mr. Ouattara won, reversing its December 2010 decision to reject them 
(UN, 2011).  
“Since taking office, President Ouattara has, on many occasions, reaffirmed his 
determination to successfully carry out the much needed reconciliation process to 
consolidate the achievements recorded and enable Côte d'Ivoire to open a new 
chapter in its history. Noteworthy, is the planned establishment of a Dialogue, Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, which is in line with the proposals of the AU High
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Level Panel, as endorsed by the PSC (AU, 2011c). A second major emphasis, he 
said, would be the collection and destruction of arms, primarily through voluntary 
relinquishment but under the threat of criminal prosecution or coercive means, if 
necessary (Cook, 2011: 6).  
The AU, in close cooperation with ECOWAS, has continued to support the peace 
consolidation process in Côte d'Ivoire. “To this end, consultations are underway with 
ECOWAS to agree on the modalities of a joint action by both organizations in 
support of the efforts of the Ivorian authorities” (AU, 2011c).  
4.4.3 Contribution of the AU to Continental Security  
The interest of this study is in the contribution of the AU towards the development of 
a security community and therefore the evidence from this case study should support 
this.  The evaluation can conclude that the AU, in this case study, contributed to the 
promotion of continental security in both the nascent and mature phase.  
To this extent, the intervention of ECOWAS was premised on the grounds of the 
“ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” (ECOWAS, 2010a) 
which is consistent with Article 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
Most notably, Article 3 (g) “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance”, and Article 4 (m) “respect of democratic 
principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Juma, 2006: 50).  
This again points to the willingness of Member States to become involved, and their 
commitment to upholding the “new” norms that have been introduced with the 
transition from the OAU to AU. In this case, the “new” norm would refer to the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance that was adopted by the AU in 
2007. Article 2 of the Charter stipulates the objectives of the Charter to include 1) 
Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of 
democracy and respect for human rights; 3) Promote the holding of regular free and 
fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority of representative government as 
well as democratic change of governments; and 4) Prohibit, reject and condemn 
unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to 
stability, peace, security and development (AU, 2007a).  
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Condemnation of the events in Côte d’Ivoire was not exclusive to ECOWAS, but was 
swiftly followed by a similar response from the AU (Art. 23 (4) & Art. 25 of the AU’s 
Charter on Democracy, Election, and Governance) which condemned the actions of 
Gbagbo, and declared Mr. Ouattara as the legitimate leader. The response from both 
the AU and ECOWAS was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from both 
the organizations. Both organizations also imposed sanctions, and supported similar 
sanctions imposed by the international community.  
As Chitiyo (2011) has noted “it is true that ultimately it was the military power of the 
pro-Ouattara forces, UNOCI and French forces that ousted Mr Gbagbo. However, 
ECOWAS sanctions had already eroded Mr Gbagbo's power. Ivory Coast's use of 
the CFA franc, which it shares with seven other West African countries, and its 
participation in the regional central bank, made Mr Gbagbo highly vulnerable when 
the region handed over control of the Ivorian currency to his rival. It became 
increasingly difficult for Mr Gbagbo to pay the civil service and his soldiers”.  
Nigeria, after the refusal of Gbagbo to acknowledge the request of ECOWAS and the 
AU, threatened the use of “legitimate” force. This would never have materialised, as 
the UN already had a presence in Côte d’Ivoire, and not all UNSC members UNSC 
responded favourably to this request (most notably Russia). Regardless of the 
outcome of the threat of the use of force, it illustrates Nigeria’s commitment to 
upholding the norms and principles of both ECOWAS and the AU, especially within 
its sphere of “authority”.  
As noted by Chitiyo (2011) “from the outset, and to their credit, ECOWAS and the 
AU recognised Mr. Ouattara as the winner of the elections and insisted that Mr 
Gbagbo step down or face legitimate force". Importantly, Nigeria never opted to act 
outside the perimeters of the AU, which might have been the case in the years prior 
to the AU. Nigeria also first exhausted other solutions in the form of several 
mediation attempts by different African Heads of State on different occasions, before 
considering the use of legitimate force.  
The hard line position taken by the AU and ECOWAS against the illegal takeover 
has to be seen to back its pledge to support democratic transitions of power. Ivory 
Coast is a step change in Africa's support for electoral democracy and democratic 
transitions. Over the past decade, the tradition has been for power-sharing 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za


governments to resolve post-electoral disputes, as in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Kenya 
(Chitiyo, 2011).    
Power sharing is an important way of resolving military conflict, but it does not 
always resolve political conflict.  Ivory Coast may mark a shift away from the power-
sharing default setting, and back to the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the 
national leader and forming a government of their choice, either inclusive or single 
party government. It is too early to pass a definitive judgement, but arguably Africa's 
commitment to a democratic transition in Ivory Coast means that, for now at least, 
the continent passed the democracy test in that country (Chitiyo, 2011).    
Table 1. Contribution of the AU to the Development of an African Security Community 
Tier One 
Precipitating 
Conditions 
-Change in technology, demography, economics, the environment 
-Development of  new interpretations of social reality 
-External threats 
AMIB, AMIS, and the 
AU in Côte d’Ivoire 
The “development of security communities can be termed as social 
constructivist. The notion that security communities are socially constructed 
means that they have a history, and therefore exhibit an evolutionary 
pattern”. Thus, the case studies could not contribute to the precipitating 
conditions, as they had to follow it. However, two conditions are relevant to 
the AU. The failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, and it can be argued 
that the AU was a direct consequence of the precipitating conditions, and 
an expression of the intent and purpose of the African leaders. 
Tier Two 
1. Structure: Power 
and Knowledge 
2. Process: 
Transactions, 
Organizations and 
Social Learning 
-Intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states 
-Changes in the organization and production of security 
-A core state or coalition remains important for stabilizing and encouraging 
further development 
-Harder for states and their people to imagine settling differences through 
violence 
-Alter how they organize their security and define the threat 
AMIB 
 
 
 
The AU’s first military deployment since its inception in 2002, points to the 
commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the 
problems facing the continent. This includes the institutionalization of 
expectations in both domestic and supranational settings, a shared identity 
amongst members e.g. Acting under the banner of the AU, and the 
extensive and intensive patterns that have developed since the inception of 
the AU in 2002 e.g. Without these patterns a coordinated effort of this scale 
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AMIB 
would have been impossible. The intervention was committed to finding a 
peaceful solution to the situation in Burundi, as prescribed by Security 
Community Theory the use of violence is unimaginable. South Africa 
willingly assumed the responsibility of lead nation and contributed the 
necessary resources “to get the job done”, which as a core state is 
important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of a 
security community.  
AMIS The AU did again not hesitate to get involved and made the situation in 
Darfur a priority. In addition, the mission was undertaken under the 
collective identity and decision making of the AU. There was a coordinated 
effort from several African states, which is evidence of the existence of 
extensive and intensive patterns between them. The reason for the AU 
intervention can be traced to Article 4 (h), which even though not 
proclaimed, did not prevent the organisation to intervene in the internal 
affairs of a member state. This is evidence that the AU is not only a norm 
“entrepreneur”, but also a promoter of its newly established norms. In 
addition the military effort of the AU in Sudan is evidence of a change and 
the organization of security in Africa under the AU e.g. The PSC and the 
ASF initiative.  
AU in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the principles of the AU’s 
Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance that promote free and 
fair elections, and rejects unconstitutional changes of government. This 
illustrates the AU’s commitment to act, in unison and without compromise, 
on its established norms. Also to promote these norms among member 
states. In this case, the regional grouping ECOWAS, under the leadership 
of Nigeria, played a critical role in mediation efforts. Pointing, as prescribed 
in Security Community Theory, to the role-played by core states to facilitate 
and promote norms, and thereby legitimizing these norms and attracting 
other members. The lead role played by Nigeria and the support it received 
from the AU, points to the intensive networks that exist between the bodies, 
the changing and organization of security on the continent, and especially 
the trust that has developed between them e.g. Nigeria and other ECOWAS 
members, and trust between ECOWAS members and other AU member 
states. Finally, the involvement of the International Community e.g. France 
and the UN point to two distinctly different realities. A recognition by the AU 
that it cannot resolve Africa’s problems on its own and would therefore in 
future depend on the assistance of the International Community, or the 
International Community undermining the efforts of the AU to resolve its 
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AU in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
own issues and unilaterally acting without their “consent”. The former could 
in future play an important role in the development of an African Security 
Community, whilst the latter could complicate the formation of such a 
community.  
Tier Three 
1. Mutual Trust 
2. Collective Identity 
-Multilateralism 
-Changes in military planning 
-Common definition of the threat 
-Discourse and language of the community 
AMIB, AMIS, and the 
AU in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In all three cases all decision making, conflict resolution and conflict 
mediation were done via the AU (e.g. multilaterally as prescribed by 
Security Community Theory) and are more consensual than other state 
relations. In AMIB (91st Session of the Central Organ of the OAU 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution), AMIS 
(HCFA & AU PSC 17th Meeting), and Côte d’Ivoire (Extraordinary Session 
of the ECOWAS & AU PSC 252nd Meeting). “This type of architecture 
reflects the high degree of trust present in the relationship and that common 
interests are handled through common and consensual mechanisms”. The 
evidence from the case studies supports the Tier 3 outcome that none of 
the military planning includes “worst case” scenarios against any member 
state. “Even though there might be some concern about the degree of 
cooperation and contribution to a joint military campaign, those within the 
community are not counted as potential enemies”. In all the cases, there 
was a clear and concise recognition of the threat, as well as common 
agreement on the threat. Finally, “the state’s normative discourse and 
actions reflect community standards”. The case studies are the AU’s 
actions, which from the evidence in this study reflect the community 
standards. Finally, the associated discourse also reflects community 
standards e.g. Intervention in Burundi for peace building purposes,  the 
condemnation of the situation in Sudan, and  the call for Gbagbo to step 
down and respect the democratic will of the people in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to present evidence from case studies in Africa that 
support the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 2 and 3 of this research 
project. In chapter two, a detailed presentation was made of Security Community 
Theory, which included a framework for the analysis of the development of security 
communities. In chapter three, this framework was utilised to determine where 
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possible contributions were made by the AU towards the development of a security 
community in Africa.   
This chapter included three African case studies. The first of these is AMIB. AMIB 
achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent conflict and 
secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire 
agreements, the DDR programme, and the UN deployment.  The AMIB points to the 
commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the problems 
facing the continent, especially when the UN is unable to do so. Its mandate was in 
accordance with UN principles and standards, international humanitarian law and the 
laws of armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough mandate for the AU troops 
to complete their mission to the extent that its resources allowed without a resort to 
unnecessary violence. It also illustrated a commitment from various African states to 
become involved and assist with South Africa willingly assuming the responsibility of 
lead nation and contributing the necessary resources “to get the job done”. Finally, 
the AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with 
ONUB in 2004. 
The second case study is the AMIS. The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what 
seemed an impossible situation. A member state was actively directing murder and 
displacement against parts of its own population, while the outside world called for 
the AU to launch a military operation against the will of the state in question. Even 
though the AMIB had just been completed, the AU again did not refrain from getting 
involved in yet another conflict. The chairperson of the AU “Alpha Konaré blazed the 
diplomatic trail to Darfur”, and the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of 
the AU was quick to authorize the deployment of AMIS. Similar to the AMIB several 
African states were willing and in the position to become involved with major and 
minor contributions from several African states. Even though the situation did not, 
according to the AU, warrant intervention under Article 4 (h) the AU continued to 
seek a resolution and to this extent authorized AMIS, which would later become 
AMIS II, AMIS IIE and eventually UNAMID. This illustrates the AU’s continued 
support to uphold peace and stability, as it authorized an intervention in the affairs of 
a Member State to broker peace and provide humanitarian assistance. However, it 
should be noted that the AMIS achieved limited success. It seems few lessons were 
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learned from the peacekeeping experiences in Burundi as similar mistakes were 
made in Darfur (Sudan), and in the end could not find a lasting solution.   
The third case study is the AU reaction to the post-election crisis in Côte D’Ivoire. 
The intervention of the ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the grounds of 
the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the AU Charter 
on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This illustrates the commitment to, and 
respect for, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance. In addition, the intervention again points to the 
willingness of member states to become involved, and their commitment to 
upholding the “new” norms of the AU. The response from both the AU and ECOWAS 
was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from both the organisations, 
which shows that leaders on the continent no longer simply talk, but are willing to 
“walk the walk”. Nigeria went as far as threatening Gbagbo with the use of 
“legitimate” force. As noted by Chitiyo (2011)  credit should be given to the ECOWAS 
and AU for their blanket response to the situation, their unwillingness to compromise, 
and their willingness to resort to “legitimate force” if needed. Most notably Côte 
d’Ivoire might mark a shift away from the power-sharing default setting, and back to 
the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the national leader.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summary  
The purpose of this study has been to interrogate the contributions of the AU to the 
potential development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. 
To facilitate the study, the following research question was formulated: How has the 
AU contributed towards the development of an African security community 
since its inception in 2002? The central research question is supported by three 
sub-questions 
In Chapter 2 the first sub-question: How can Security Community Theory be 
utilized to interrogate the contribution of the AU? is discussed. The discussion 
includes a history of regional security, a conceptual analysis of security, a conceptual 
analysis of community, the theory of constructivism and its relation to regional 
security, Deutsch’s (1957) theory of security communities, and Adler & Barnett’s 
(1998) theory of security communities. To interrogate the contribution of the AU to 
the development of an African security community Adler & Barnett’s (1998: 38) 
Framework for the study of Security Communities (Figure 1) is introduced.  
The framework is organised around three tiers. The first tier consists of precipitating 
factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and co-
ordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the structural elements of power 
and ideas, and the process elements of transactions, international organizations and 
social learning. The dynamic, positive and reciprocal relationship between these 
variables leads to the third tier: the development of trust and collective identity 
formation. The sequenced and causal relationship between these three tiers is 
responsible for the production of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler 
& Barnett, 1998:30). 
In Chapter 3 the second sub-question: Which contributions according to Security 
Community Theory have the AU made to continental security? is discussed. 
Here the transition from the OAU to the AU is presented, and the AU’s contributions 
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to continental security, peace, and stability were categorically interrogated along the 
three tiers of the Framework. 
The precipitating conditions (Tier One) for the development of an African security 
community can be explained as: the failure of the OAU and its ability to adapt, the 
end of the Cold War and the new arrangement of the post-Cold war international 
system, a general disinterest from the West in the post-Cold War period with regards 
to African security affairs, the political and economic benefits of “acting” as one, and 
the realization by African leaders that in the future “African problems” will have to be 
met with “African solutions”. It can be argued that the AU was a direct consequence 
of the precipitating conditions, and an expression of the intent and purpose of the 
African leaders.  
The AU’s role becomes especially significant in Tier Two. It facilitated both the 
categories of the ascendant phase: structure and process. The regional hegemons 
South Africa and Nigeria, as well as potential hegemon Libya, was able to deliver 
their grandeur visions for Africa through the AU. It also served as a site where 
knowledge could be disseminated and in itself as a norm entrepreneur. In the 
process category it facilitated, and even accelerated transactions between states; 
acted as an organization and introduced new organizations and institutions; and 
again served as a site for social learning among the various member states.  
Finally, the dynamic and positive relationships among the variables are the 
wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity. This African identity formation 
process is enshrined in the articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the 
NEPAD Framework, the AU PSC, and the CADSP. It can be argued that these 
articles facilitate this process of identity formation. In addition, the Accra declaration 
is significant evidence of the continued pursuit of a singular African identity, and the 
most explicit example of the existence of African identity is the number of joint AU 
peacekeeping missions that have occurred since the inception of the Union.  
These peacekeeping missions, which involve intensive military cooperation and the 
sharing of sensitive information, are also evidence of the level of mutual trust that 
exists among the member states of the AU. Again, this points to the AU as a 
principal promoter of trust. The promotion of trust by the AU is also evident in the 
articles of the Constitutive Act, the PSC and CADSP. For example, the CADSP is a 
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common understanding between African states about their defence and security 
challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those 
challenges and includes a common understanding of the concepts of defence, 
security, and common threats. Another example is the ASF, which because of its 
composition necessitates an extraordinary high level of interstate cooperation, and 
collaboration in extremely sensitive areas such as Command, Control, 
Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance systems.  
In Chapter 4 the third sub-question: Can these contributions be illustrated with 
an African case study(s) in which the AU was/is involved? is discussed. As case 
studies the AMIB, the AMIS, and the intervention of the AU in Côte d’Ivoire are 
included. These case studies are included for their important and relevant 
contributions to the potential development of an African Security Community.  
AMIB achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. It managed the violent 
conflict and secured conditions conducive to the implementation of the peace and 
ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, and the UN deployment.  The AMIB 
points to the commitment by the AU to find peaceful and collective solutions to the 
problems facing the continent, especially when the UN is unable to do so. Its 
mandate was in accordance with UN principles and standards, international 
humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, it was a forceful enough 
mandate for the AU troops to complete their mission to the extent that its resources 
allowed. It also illustrated a commitment from various African states to become 
involved and assist with South Africa willingly assuming the responsibility of lead 
nation and contributing the necessary resources “to get the job done”. Finally, the 
AU’s commitment in Burundi continued even when AMIB was replaced with ONUB in 
2004. 
The Darfur crisis placed the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. A 
member state was actively directing murder and displacement of parts of its own 
population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation 
against the will of the state in question. Even though the AMIB had just been 
completed, the AU again did not refrain from getting involved in yet another conflict. 
The chairperson of the AU “Alpha Konaré blazed the diplomatic trail to Darfur”, and 
the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the AU was quick to authorize 
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the deployment of AMIS. Similar to the AMIB several African states were willing and 
in the position to become involved with major and minor contributions from several 
African states. Even though the situation did not, according to the AU, warrant 
intervention under Article 4 (h) the AU continued to seek a resolution and to this 
extent authorized AMIS, which would later become AMIS II, AMIS IIE and eventually 
UNAMID. This illustrates the AU’s continued support to uphold peace and stability, 
as it authorized an intervention in the affairs of a Member State to broker peace and 
provide humanitarian assistance. However, it should be noted that the AMIS 
achieved limited success. It seems few lessons were learned from the peacekeeping 
experiences in Burundi as similar mistakes were made in Darfur (Sudan), and in the 
end could not find a lasting solution.   
The final case study was the AU reaction to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The 
intervention of the ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire was premised on the grounds of the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the AU Charter on 
Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This illustrates the commitment to, and 
respect for, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance. In addition, the intervention again points to the 
willingness of Member States to become involved, and their commitment to 
upholding the “new” norms of the AU. The response from both the AU and ECOWAS 
was reinforced with the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from both the organizations, 
which shows that leaders on the continent no longer simply talk, but are willing to 
“walk the walk”. Nigeria even went as far as threatening Gbagbo with the use of 
“legitimate” force. As noted by Chitiyo (2011)  credit should be given to the ECOWAS 
and AU for their blanket response to the situation, their unwillingness to compromise, 
and their willingness to resort to “legitimate force” if needed. Most notably Côte 
d’Ivoire might mark a shift away from the power-sharing default setting, and back to 
the tradition of the electoral winner becoming the national leader.  
5.2 Key Findings  
Franke (2008: 333) calls “for a less cynical view of inter-African security cooperation. 
Despite the tensions and rivalries that have characterized Africa’s institutional 
landscape thus far have cast a penumbra of doubt over the ability of the continent to 
establish a viable peace and security architecture, the past decade has seen several 
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important developments”. Similarly, this study is able to illustrate, concerning the 
important developments in the area of peace and security in Africa that significant 
contributions have been made by the AU since its inception since 2002.  
Franke (2008: 325) concludes, “It seems as if the continent currently displays all the 
essential characteristics of (at least) a loosely coupled security community”. To 
declare the existence of an African security community would be premature, and is 
not within the scope of this study, however currently there are striking similarities 
between the theory and the existing developments in Africa under the AU. When 
compared against Security Community Theory it can be concluded that the AU has 
made significant contributions at all three tiers of the theory, and therefore major 
contributions to the potential development of an African security community (see 
Chapter 3 & 4).  
As mentioned, to proclaim the existence of an African security community is 
premature, however insufficient time has passed to refute the argument, and 
therefore the potential development of such a community. Only nine years have 
passed since the inception of the AU in 2002, and when compared to the EU, which 
is considered the model example of a security community, is not enough. The 
beginnings of the EU can be traced to September 1946 when Winston Churchill in a 
speech called for a “kind of United States of Europe”. The foundation for the 
integration of the Union was laid in 1952 “when the leaders of six war weary 
European nations signed the Treaty of Paris and created the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) (Venter & Neuland, 2004: 56). Nearly 60 years on the 
“process” is still not complete.  
As noted by Engel &Porto (2010: 143) “common to all authors is the recognition that 
the political, institutional and normative processes that underpin the transformation of 
the OAU into the AU have the potential to transform the way the continent addresses 
the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development with 
potentially significant consequences”... “yet, permeating these pages is also 
acknowledgement that in creating the African Peace and Security Architecture, the 
AU is treading in new, unchartered waters for which there are no templates, no 
proven recipes, no off-the-shelf roadmaps”. Utilizing Security Community Theory this 
study is able to identify possible contributions by the AU to the development of a 
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potential African Security Community, but is also able to identify several (possible) 
key challenges that might hinder, in future, the contributions by the AU to the 
development of such a community.   
The first and most commonly acknowledged challenge to the AU is a lack of 
resources. “One of the most notable characteristics of contemporary inter-African 
security cooperation is the crucial importance of external and material support 
(Franke, 2009: 239). A “substantial number of states continues not to meet their 
contributions to the organization, increasing its dependency on external aid, raising 
the issue of sustainability and ownership. Since January 2006, 75 percent of the 
entire AU budget has been paid by only five countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria 
and South Africa” (Williams 2009: 619). In addition, “the escalation of conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa and Central of Africa, coupled with election-related disputes and 
violence, has substantially increased the demands on the organization” (Engel & 
Porto, 2010: 153). This challenge was evident in both the AMIB and AMIS.  
A second challenge is “the loosely defined relationship with the UN, which may 
challenge the effectiveness of collaboration between the two bodies” (Söderbaum & 
Hettne, 2010: 22). Tension is evident from the case in Côte d’Ivoire where continued 
failure of an AU intervention led to decisive action from the UN and France. This 
action, even though effective, impeded on the territorial authority of the AU, and 
could potentially antagonize future relations. However, this need not be the case as 
the UN Charter under Chapter 8 Art. 52-54, the AU Constitutive Act Article 3 (e), and 
the AU PSC Protocol Article 4 provides for a positive relationship to exist.  
 As Söderbaum & Hettne (2010: 22) has noted “the challenge is to construct 
arrangements in which the two logics complement one another”. Such a relationship 
would be crucial for the development of an African security community as it could 
potentially guarantee crucial funding, and logistical assistance that would assist the 
AU during its embryonic phase. Also in recent times, “the UN has suffered a decline 
in power and authority and therefore needs support from regional bodies. A 
combined multi-regional strategy provides the most feasible solution for the future” 
(Söderbaum & Hettne, 2010: 30).  
A final finding of this study is the role that core states will perform in the AU. As 
prescribed by Security Community Theory  “we expect that a core state or a coalition 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za


of core states remains important for stabilizing and encouraging the further 
development” (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 54). It is therefore essential that influential and 
capable states (e.g. South Africa in AMIB and Nigeria in ECOWAS) play a leading 
role in the performance of the AU. “A community formed around a group of strong 
power creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be 
able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that 
community”.  Also core states don't only have the capability to motivate the weaker 
states to become a part of the collective, but even at times to coerce others to 
maintain a collective stance” (Ngoma, 2005: 54).  
In addition, these core states could potentially provide strategic leadership which as 
noted by Makinda & Okumu (2008: 71) “is crucial for the achievement of greater 
unity and solidarity between African states and peoples”. The term strategic 
leadership, in this context, means the capacity to provide clear vision, inspiration, 
and effective strategies for mobilizing human, financial, scientific, and social 
resources. Strategic leadership “should help to identify the resources on which 
policies should focus, secure markets for Africa’s goods, construct structures that 
empower the people, and initiate productive linkages between internal agents, 
regional actors, and the global community (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 72).  
5.3 Conclusion  
This study interrogated the potential contributions of the AU towards the 
development of an African security community since its inception in 2002. To 
achieve this Security Community Theory by Adler & Barnett (1998) and Deutsch 
(1957) was utilised. More specifically the framework for the analysis of the 
development of security communities, as presented by Adler & Barnett (1998: 38) 
was used.  
Utilizing the theory, this study is able to illustrate that the AU has made significant 
contributions towards the development of peace and security in Africa. In particular, 
it can be concluded that the AU has made significant contributions at all three tiers of 
the framework, and therefore major contributions to the potential development of an 
African security community. However, the AU is still in its embryonic phase, and any 
prediction concerning the existence, or future existence of an African security 
community would be premature.  
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Even though there are ostensibly, positive developments in the area of continental 
peace and security many challenges remain, as this study is able to illustrate. The 
first is a lack of resources. The AU is heavily dependent on the contributions of its 
member states, and as a number of members persistently fail to meet their 
contributions to the organization, they compromise both the sustainability and 
ownership of the AU in areas of peace and security on the continent. This was 
evident in AMIB and AMIS. As the AU become increasingly dependent on external 
aid, external donors become expectant of greater involvement and influence in the 
affairs of the AU, albeit directly or indirectly.  
This leads to a second challenge that this study is able to identify “the loosely 
defined relationship with the UN” and other external partners. It is crucial that a 
constructive relationship be established as provided for in the UN Charter under 
Chapter 8 Article 52-54, the AU Constitutive Act Article 3 (e), and the AU PSC 
Protocol Article 4. If not, differences as was evident in Côte d’Ivoire might antagonise 
the two organisations and negatively affect any future contributions of the AU 
towards the development of an African security community. However, a clearly 
defined and mutually respectful relationship will provide the necessary assistance 
and resources to “carry” the AU through its embryonic phase, and support the 
development of an African security community in the future.  
The role of core states, most notably regional hegemons such as South Africa and 
Nigeria will remain important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development 
of an African security community. As long as these states continue to subscribe to 
the “new” norms and values of the AU, they will legitimise the process and attract 
other smaller states to similar behaviour. Core states also create the expectation that 
weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and 
potentially other benefits that are associated with that community, and have the 
capability to motivate and if necessary to coerce others to maintain a collective 
stance. Finally, as noted by Makinda & Okumu (2008: 71) core states can offer 
strategic leadership, which will be “crucial for the achievement of greater unity and 
solidarity between African states and peoples”. 
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